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Cover: The courtesan of hell dreaming of skeletons playing at various pastimes. An oban print by Gyosai published in 1874.

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Go World News

News from Japan

Cho Chikun Retakes the Kisei Title

One year after losing the Kisei title to Kobayashi Satoru, Cho Chikun came back as the challenger and defeated Kobayashi by a score of four wins to three losses in this best-of-seven match to re-establish himself as the number one player in Japan. The series started out ominously for Cho. After only 85 moves, to the surprise of all those watching, Cho resigned. Although he had an inferior position, it was not all that certain that he would lose, but it seems that after he made some dubious moves and his moyo strategy failed, he became disheartened and lost his will to fight on. It was feared that his slump of last year was to continue into 1996. But then Cho won the next three games to put Kobayashi at *kadoban*. Kobayashi fought back and won the next two games to even the series. The title now hinged on the last game. In that game, Kobayashi, playing Black, built a huge moyo in the center, but he made a dubious move with 59 and that was the only chance Cho

needed. He cut through Kobayashi's position, wiped out his moyo, and forced him to resign after 136 moves.

With this title and the Honinbo, Cho now holds two of the three top titles, making him the indisputable number one player in Japan.

Commentaries on the first four games of this title match begin on page 19.

The 34th Judan Title Match

Yoda Defends His Title Against O Rissei

For the second time in the span of less than five months, O Rissei became the challenger for a big-seven title. In the final round of the double elimination tournament to decide the challenger for the Judan title, O defeated Kobayashi Satoru. Poor Satoru defeated all his opponents throughout the tournament, but on February 15, 1996 he had to face the winner of the losers' section, who turned out to be O Rissei. O, playing White, forced Kobayashi to resign after 240 moves.

In the first game of the title match, played on March 7, O wasn't so fortunate. Yoda, play-



Kobayashi Koichi, who held the Kisei title for eight consecutive terms, joins in the analysis after the fourth game of this year's Kisei title match.



O Rissei exudes confidence after winning the second game of the Judan title match.

ing Black, won by 1 1/2 points, but O came back to win the second game and to even the series by forcing Yoda to resign after 207 moves.

The third game was held in Omachi, Nagano Prefecture, where the World Amateur Go Championship is scheduled to be held this May. O played quite badly and Yoda forced him to resign after only 155 moves. O was now at *kadoban*.

The fourth game, played on April 10, was a cliffhanger. After a hard-fought game Yoda (White) emerged victorious by only half a point, defending his title by a score of three wins to one loss.

The 51st Honinbo League

Ryu Shikun to Challenge Cho Chikun

This year's Honinbo league was again dominated in the early stages by Yo Kagen who seemed a sure bet to become the challenger after winning his first four games while all the other players in the league had at least two losses. But then he hit a wall. First, he lost Ryu Shikun, and then to Kataoka Satoshi. Yo still had a chance, however. In the final round, he was pitted against Kato Masao, last year's challenger. Whoever won that game was at least guaranteed to get into a playoff with Ryu Shikun, if Ryu beat Miyazawa Goro. But Yo lost to Kato and Ryu beat Miyazawa, setting

The 51st Honinbo League (final result). Title Holder: Cho Chikun

Rank		KM	YS	OR	YK	RS	MG	KS	NH	Won	Lost
1	Kato Masao		○	●	○	●	○	○	○	5	2
2	Yuki Satoshi	●		○	●	●	●	○	●	2	5
3	O Rissei	○	●		●	●	○	○	●	3	4
4	Yo Kagen	●	○	○		●	○	●	○	4	3
5	Ryu Shikun	○	○	○	○		○	●	●	5	2
5	Miyazawa Goro	●	○	●	●	●		●	○	2	5
5	Kataoka Satoshi	●	●	●	○	○	○		○	4	3
5	Nakano Hironari	●	○	○	●	○	●	●		3	4

up a playoff between Kato and Ryu to decide who would challenge Cho for the title. In the playoff, held on April 11, Kato lost by only half a point.

Everybody will be watching to see how Ryu does against Cho. Ryu has already beaten two formidable players, Rin Kaiho and Kobayashi Koichi, in Tengen title matches. However, Cho could be a much tougher opponent. He seems to be in excellent form this year with a Japanese-tournament record of 18 wins to 4 losses, and he will be determined to break Sakata's record of holding this title for seven consecutive terms. That would then give him a chance to challenge Takagawa's record of nine consecutive terms. The first game of the best-of-seven title match is scheduled for May 13-14, 1996.

Besides Ryu, Kato, and Yo, the other player retaining his place for next year's league is Kataoka Satoshi, who challenged Cho for this title in 1994. Dropped from the league were Yuki Satoshi, O Rissei, Miyazawa Goro, and Nakano Hironari.

The 21st Meijin League: Cho in the Lead

This year's Meijin league is wide open, with all of the participants having suffered at least one loss. However, as of this writing Cho Chikun seems to be a slight favorite for becoming the challenger with four wins against only one loss.

International Go

The 10th China-Japan Super Go Series After a Gallant Effort, Otake Loses to Ma

The honor of Japan was partially restored by Otake Hideo 9-dan. As we reported in *Go World* 75, he managed to beat Chang Hao, who had almost single-handedly wiped out the Japanese team, and then went on to defeat Yu Bin. He next defeated Cao Dayuan on January 26, then two days later he beat Liu Xiaoguang. However, on March 31 in Beijing, he was finally defeated by Ma Xiaochun, thereby ending the hopes of the Japanese team. The services of Nie Weiping, who has often saved the Chinese team from defeat in the past, were not needed this year.

The 9th Fujitsu Cup

The first two rounds of the 1996 Fujitsu Cup were held on April 6 and 8. This year's finals will undoubtedly be exciting, with a new face as well as the usual veterans having made it to the quarterfinals.

The most interesting upset to occur in the first round was the defeat of Yuki Satoshi, a promising young player from the Kansai Ki-in, at the hands of America's Jimmy Cha. This should not have come as much of a surprise, though, for Cha has defeated a number of famous Japanese 9-dans in past Fujitsu Cup tournaments, most notably Cho Chikun. But

The 21st Meijin League (as of 94/4/19). Title Holder: Takemiya Masaki

Rank		KK	OR	CC	KM	KS	RK	YN	KN	OM	Won	Lost
1	Kobayashi Koichi			○			●	○			2	1
2	O Rissei	●						○	○		2	1
3	Cho Chikun	●	○		○	○				○	4	1
4	Kato Masao			●			○		○	○	3	1
5	Kataoka Satoshi		●				○		○	○	3	1
6	Rin Kaiho	○			●	●		○		○	3	2
7	Yoda Norimoto	●	●				●		●		0	4
7	Kudo Norio		●		●	●		○		●	1	4
7	O Meien			●	●	●	●		○		1	4

then in the second round he was pitted against the powerful Ma Xiaochun, last year's Fujitsu Cup winner, and Cha was forced to resign.

Another casualty of the second round was Nie Weiping, who lost to Lee Chang-ho, Korea's number-one player. Another big gun to fall was Cho Chikun, who lost to Liu Xiaoguang from China. A surprising survivor of the second round was the legendary Fujisawa Shuko. Although he is now 70 years old, he still remains a formidable player, proven by the fact that he defeated 34-year-old Cao Dayuan, one of China's top players.

Both Kobayashi Koichi and Kobayashi Satoru made it into the quarterfinals. Koichi (Black) beat Cho Hun-hyun, Korea's number-two player, by 6 1/2 points and Satoru forced Yu Bin of China to resign.

Another young player from China who made it into the top eight is 19-year-old Chang Hao. As regular readers of *Go World* know, Chang is the player who nearly wiped out the entire Japanese team in last year's Japan-China Super Go Series. (A full report on his triumph there starts on page 60.) This is Chang's first appearance in the Fujitsu Cup.

Finally, O Meien beat Yoo Chang-hyuk, the 1993 Fujitsu Cup winner. O is 34 years old and is originally from Taiwan, but he plays in Japan as a member of the Nihon Ki-in. He has played in the Meijin league three times and in the Honinbo league once.

The quarterfinals will be held on May 31 in Pusan, Korea. The pairings for that round will be:

O Meien vs. Lee Chang-ho

Kobayashi Koichi vs. Chang Hao

Fujisawa Shuko vs. Liu Xiaoguang

Kobayashi Satoru vs. Ma Xiaochun

The semifinals are scheduled for July 6 and the finals for August 3.

China-Korea-Japan Meijin Tournament The World's Strongest Player

Last year, the annual Japan-China Meijin match was discontinued, but a new three-country match has now been inaugurated, pitting the Chinese, Korean, and Japanese Meijins against each other in a double-round robin tournament. Each player will play the others two games, one in their home country and another in their opponent's country. Sponsors of this tournament are the Korean daily newspaper Dong A Ilbo and the Korean automaker Daewoo. The winner's prize is 100,000,000 won (about US\$125,000).

The first game of this tournament was played on April 10, 1996 between Takemiya Masaki and Lee Chang-ho at the Nihon Ki-in in Tokyo. A few days before the game, Takemiya was asked whether he thought he would win the tournament. Takemiya answered that he wasn't sure if he would win, but no matter what the result, he would show



Lee looks as if he is giving Takemiya a lesson. Against the wall from the left are O Meien 9-dan, Rui Naiwei 9-dan (the world's strongest female player), and her husband Jiang Zhujiu 9-dan.

the other Meijins how good go was played. Sure enough, Takemiya played a beautiful game and had a clear advantage through most of it. But Lee fought back and, after Takemiya made a number of dubious moves, a ko fight started. Takemiya ended the fight too quickly and White was able to capture some of Black's stones. Below is the game with a brief commentary.

White: Lee Chang-ho

Black: Takemiya Masaki

Komi: 5 1/2 points; time: 4 hours each.




Figure 1 (1-81)

Figure 1 (1-81). A contest of wills

A contest of wills begins when Black plays 11. White jumps to 12 to counter Black's moyo strategy. To punish White for not answering 11, Black attaches at 13, but again White defies Black and jumps out into the center with 14. With 37, Black takes the lead. Even after White 42, a black invasion in the upper left corner is possible.

With 37, Black takes the lead. Even after White 42, a black invasion in the upper left corner is possible.

White 46 should have been at 48. Black 47 is an excellent response. It threatens to take the corner with A or to link up to his stone at 5 with 49.

White 50 was crude. Because of it, Black 59 became a strong move.

Up to 81, Black has a clear advantage. His *moyo* on the left gives him a large potential territory, he threatens to kill the white group on the right side with B, and White's five other stones on the lower right are in trouble. Moreover, the cut at C leaves White with bad *aji*.




Figure 2 (82-129)

Figure 2 (82-129)

Black should have simply played at 119 without the atari of 117. By making this atari White's bad *aji* was erased and Black's group on the left was severely attacked from 120 on.

Black 121 should have been at 122.




Figure 3 (130-218)

145, 148, 150: take ko (85); 158, 173, 166, 173, 176, 179: take ko (54); 187: at 68; 216: at 111

Figure 3 (130-218)

If Black had played 181 at 182 he would have won.

Black 185 was Black's last mistake. If he had played this move at 188 his group would have lived in a *seki*.

White wins by 6 1/2 points.

The 7th Tong Yang Securities Cup

Lee Chang-ho defeats Ma Xiaochun to Become World Champion



Lee Chang-ho receiving 100,000,000 won (US\$125,000) for winning the Tong Yang Securities Cup

By winning the 7th Tong Yang Securities Cup, Lee Chang-ho at the age of 20 can lay claim to being the world's strongest player. In the semifinals he beat the legendary Cho Chikun, who is probably the number one player in Japan, in a best-of-three match by winning two straight games. He then went on to defeat China's strongest player, Ma Xiaochun (who defeated Cho Hun-hyun in the other semifinal match), 3-1 in a best-of-five match. Lee, who is rated only a 7-dan by the Korean Ki-in, has completely dominated the Korean go scene, having won 19 straight titles. The wins against Cho were also part of a twelve-game winning streak in international competition.

Game Two of the Semifinal

Cho Chikun vs. Lee Chang-ho


White: Cho Chikun

Black: Lee Chang-ho

Played in Beijing on January 26, 1996.

Cho Chikun started off the 1996 by losing three important games. On January 18, he resigned the first game of the Kisei title match

(reported on page 19 of this issue), held in Amsterdam, after only 85 moves. He then had to fly to Beijing to play his best-of-three match with Lee Chang-ho, which began on January 22. His loss in the first game could be attributed to travel fatigue, but after a four-day rest, he seemed to have recovered and had the advantage in the second game of this match. But he then made a slip on the 124th move and lost the game as well as the match.



*Figure 1 (1-58)
49: connects at 42*

Figure 1 (1–58)

According to Cho, Black could capture two stones by playing 53 at 54. As it turned out, White was able to take a large territory on the lower left side with the moves up to 58.




Figure 2 (59–106)

Figure 2 (59–106)

With White 80, Cho used up his time and entered *byo-yomi*.

Black 81 is a clever move, typical of Lee.

Cho had read out the sequence from White 88 to Black 99. However, White 100 was a rash move. If he had played this move at 102, he would have had the advantage.




Figure 3 (107–153)

141: takes ko at 101; 144: takes ko at 134;
146: connects at 101

Figure 3 (107–153)

White 24 was the losing move. If Cho had played this move at A, he would have captured the four black stones on the lower right and would have had the lead.

When Black plays 53, the white stones at the bottom are dead.

White resigns after Black 153.



At the tender age of 20, the Korean go genius Lee Chang-ho defeated both Cho Chikun and Ma Xiaochun, two of the world's strongest players, to become the world go champion.

Game Four of the Final

Ma Xiaochun vs. Lee Chang-ho

White: Ma Xiaochun

Black: Lee Chang-ho

Played in Seoul on March 20, 1996.

Figure 1 (1–31)

Just as in the Cho–Lee game above, both Black and White play the *nirensai* with Black 1 and 3 and White 2 and 4. This fuseki has recently become fashionable throughout the world. In fact this opening was also played in second and fourth games of this match.

Ma seems to be particularly fond of answering the approach move of Black 5 with the small knight's move of 6.

With Black 31, Lee stakes out a moyo.




Figure 1 (1-31)

Figure 2 (32-60)

Against White 32, the hane of Black 33 is a severe move and has a good feel to it. The usual move would be to jump to 41.

Basically, Lee likes thickness, but he is capable of playing any style of go. This is one of the things that makes him such a remarkable player.

The timing of White's cut at 34 is off. He should first play 1 and 3 in *Dia. 1*, then cut with 5. In the game, Black was able to block with 35 and now, when White plays 38, Black doesn't have to connect at 44, but can cut at 39 instead and White's shape is a bit unsatisfactory.

After the atari of 40, playing another atari with 42 was a terrible move. It could be called the losing move. White should have simply captured with 1 in *Dia. 2*. After the exchange of White 3 for Black 4, White could extend to 5. If Black played 6, White would take control of the right side with 7. This would then be a difficult game for both sides.

Black 45 was a strong response to White 44. Perhaps Ma mistakenly thought that Black would play 45 at 47, after which White could play at 45 with 46.

When Black captures two stones with 51, White's big attack has been soundly rebuffed. Even when White makes the diagonal connection at 60, the life of his stones is not yet assured. It is now a difficult game for White.

White 58 becomes the actual losing move. Whatever happens, White has to play 1 and 3

in *Dia. 3*. After Black 6, White 'a' is unreasonable because Black will cut at 'b', so White will escape by jumping to 7.







Figure 2 (32-60)



Dia. 1



Dia. 2



Dia. 3

When Black plays 59, the game is essentially over. No matter how hard White fights on the right side or at the bottom, he will not be able to make sufficient inroads into Black's territory to turn the game around.



China's strongest player, Ma Xiaochun, answers Lee Chang-ho's move in the first game of the Tong Yang Securities Cup World Go Championship




Figure 3 (61–100)

Figure 3 (61–100). *Black has a big lead.*

The game has been decided: Black has a big lead, so there is no need for further commentary. This was a bad game for Ma, but he played very well in the third game. He was ahead, but at the very end there was an upset

and Lee won by half a point. Still, there is no doubt that Lee is very strong —most likely the strongest player in the world.

White resigns after Black 175.

(From reports in *Go Weekly*, February 13 and April 9, 1996. Translated by Richard Bozulich.)




Figure 4 (101–175)

The 43th Oza Title Match: Game Three

Cho Chikun vs. O Rissei

O Rissei, the King of Lightning Go, has finally taken a major title, and in his first challenge he won three straight games in this best-of-five match. It may seem as if O totally defeated Cho, seeing that result was so lopsided, but Cho initially took the lead in all three games only to lose them through careless oversights. There is a myth that once Cho has established a lead he always hangs on to it and wins, but recently this myth has been eroding, as O Rissei has demonstrated in this series.

White: O Rissei 9-dan

Black: Cho Chikun Honinbo, Oza

Komi: 5 1/2 points; time: 5 hours each.

Played on November 16, 1995.




Figure 1 (1-43)

Figure 1 (1-43). Attack and Sabaki

In response to Black 1 and 3, White immediately approached at 4. Then after Black 5, White switched to the lower left corner with 6, allowing Black to pincer at 7. After this, a currently popular joseki in the right upper corner was played.

Black 17 defends against the threat of White A from a distance.

Black approaches with 19 in the lower left corner. Sakakibara 9-dan commented that

Black is playing a fast-paced fuseki.

O plays an all-out move with White 20, but Black is satisfied when he gets to play 21 and 23. After this, the game flows naturally with Black's attack at 25 and 27 and White responding with 26 and 28.

When Black took territory with 29, White grabbed a good point at 30 to fix up his shape and to make his group safe.

At this point, Cho started to think for a long time. Even though he knows he will be at a disadvantage if he runs out of time and has to play in *byo-yomi*, something in Cho compels him to spend time seeking the truth by analyzing, analyzing and analyzing.

Nevertheless, after the game Cho regretted Black 31, played after 64 minutes of deep thought. 'I should have kept attacking this group with Black 34 as I originally intended,' he said.

Ogoshi 7-dan commented: 'White's atari at 34 thickens his group, so White can breathe a sigh of relief.' This is what Cho probably regretted.

Black 35 is an excellent point. White has no choice but to pincer with White 36. The consensus among professionals watching the game was: 'It would never be acceptable for White to let Black make a two-space extension from 35.'

Everyone agreed that Black 37 was the only move, but White 38, played after only a minute's consideration, was dubious. According to O, 'It starts a fight where White should not fight.' White should try to make *sabaki* with B, which seems to be a reasonable move in this situation.

Black prevents White from linking up his stones at 22 and 36 by playing 39. With 38 and 40, the white group in the lower left is becoming heavy. It seems as if White has damaged his game because of White 38.

After seeing Black 43, played to gain more territory, O, who played quickly in the morning in all the games of this series, takes his time thinking about his next move. After thinking for 19 minutes, it's time for the lunch

break. Compared with the first and second games in which 51 and 77 moves respectively were played in the morning, this game is being played relatively slowly.




Figure 2 (44-78)

Figure 2 (44-78). *Cho's style*

White resolutely countered Black's attack from 44 to 50, but Black moves out with 51. After the game, O commented: 'Black 51 was extremely severe.'

Black 53 is a tesuji, which does not allow White to split Black's groups with 55. Consequently, it seems as if White has no way to get out of this situation without some damage.

But O countered with White 54. Cho praised this move: 'White countered well; it was quite a good move.'

White sacrifices two stones, but he gains territory on the left side, hoping for more opportunities later on.

With Black 59 and 61, a fight in the center begins. Black 65 is a Cho-style move, striving for more than is necessary. Instead of White 66, White 67 would invite Black 66-White 71-Black A. As a result, White would find himself even farther behind.

In the middle of this intense clash of fighting spirits, Cho makes a simple, uncharacteristic mistake at Black 73. White immediately counters with 74 and 76 so that Black 75 and 77 become overconcentrated, and inefficient. All the professionals in the pressroom agreed that when White played 78, the game became too close to call.




Figure 3 (79-118)

Figure 3 (79-118). *A Crib Death*

With White 80 Black's positions on both the upper and right sides become thin. Black defends the right side with 81, but White threatens the upper side with 82 and 84, so Black has to patiently defend that group with the moves from 83.

Then when White finally catches up with Black, he makes a horrible mistake with 88. This move allows Black to take advantage of White's thin position in the center, settling his stones there from 89 to 97. The game again shifts in Black's favor. White should have played 88 at 91, followed by Black A and White 94, to thicken his center.

White, being far behind, plays a desperate all-out move with 98. In response, Cho counters with 99, a strong move with perfect accuracy. He has already read out all the sequences resulting from White 104. Black is gaining profit up through Black 113, so his victory appears to be just around the corner. Suddenly, Cho makes an unbelievable mistake, missing White 118 in his reading. When O played White 118, Cho immediately resigned.


Black 115 should have been at 1 in *Dia. 1*, followed by the moves to White 8. After that Black 'a' would have led to a won game. Cho had a misconception that White had no choice but to play 118 at 1 in *Dia. 2*. White 1 would let Black make a *ponnuki* at 4, and the ko fight after Black 8 would be favorable for Black. In the game, there is a different kind of

ko. After White 118, were Black to continue, he would connect, then White B-Black C-White D-Black E would create a ko. But Black has a much heavier burden.

'I did it again!' Cho cried out in distress. O undoubtedly felt jubilant about his win, but he remained subdued. A change in a title always creates an awkward situation.

At the banquet after the game, Cho arrived a bit earlier than O. When he saw O enter the room he said 'Hooray for O Rissei, the new Oza!'


(Go Weekly, November 28, 1995. Translated by Furuyama Kazunari)



An Introduction to Tesuji (v)


Kataoka Satoshi 9-dan

This series for novice players covers all the basic tesujis that you are likely to encounter in your games in easy-to-understand positions. In the fourth instalment we showed you some tesujis for linking up your stones. In this issue we are going to give you some examples of tesujis to prevent your opponent's stones from linking up. First try solving the three problems given below. Answers and other examples are on page 57.




Problem 1. Black to play

White has played the knight's move with his marked stone hoping to link up his two stones on the left with his allies in the corner. However, this is a false tesuji and Black can prevent White from linking up. How should Black play?



Problem 2. Black to play

Because the two marked white stones are short of liberties, Black can prevent the white stones on the left and the right from linking up. How should Black do this?




Problem 3. Black to play

Black wants to capture the three marked white stones. Where is the tesuji that will enable Black to do this?


Ten Easy Life-and-Death Problems

In each of the problems below your task is to make a living black group in the corner. A dan-level player should be able to solve these problems at a glance, but if your level is in the mid-kyus, you might have to think a bit before you find the tesuji. Answers are on page 40.


Black to play in all problems




Problem 1




Problem 2




Problem 3




Problem 4




Problem 5




Problem 6




Problem 7



Problem 8



Problem 9



Problem 10

The 21st Tengen Title Match: Game Four

Kobayashi Koichi vs. Ryu Shikun

White: Ryu Shikun Tengen

Black: Kobayashi Koichi 9-dan

Komi: 5 1/2 points; time: 5 hours each.

Played in Kobe on December 14, 1995.

Commentary by Rin Kaiho.

Report by Kawamura Katsuya.

Figure 1 (1–27). *Refusing to go along with the opponent*

The combination of 1, 3, and 5 has been Kobayashi's favorite fuseki pattern lately.

Approaching the star point with 7 was unusual. Until recently, when faced with a choice of approaching the star point or the 3–4 point, professionals have always approached the 3–4 point first.

Rin: 'In response to Black 9, taking the corner territory with 1 in *Dia. 1* would lead to the sequence to Black 14. This is what Black wants. He would gain a big territorial base in addition to an aim at 'a' or 'b' later.'

After White 24, Black could enter the 3–3 point in the lower left corner in *Dia. 2*. In this case, White would have to play at 10 immediately. Later, while aiming at 'a', Black could attach at 'b' or 'c'. If he attaches at 'c', the attachment at 'd' would be a possible follow-up move.






Figure 1 (1–27)



Dia. 1



Dia. 2





Figure 2 (28–44)

Figure 2 (28–44). *Black's group is becoming heavy.*


Rin: 'White 28 is an interesting move. If he made the usual extension to 1 in *Dia. 3*, the sequence to 13 would probably follow. White would get a solid 30-point territory on the left side. But this would be a different game.'

Rin: 'Instead of 33, I like Black 1 in *Dia. 4*. If White captures two stones with 10, Black will play 11. After this, Black would be entitled to play 'a'–White 'b'–Black 'c' in sente.


would be painful for White. Therefore, White would atari at 1 and jump to 3 in *Dia. 5*. This time Black would catch two white stones when he turns with 6. I don't think that this result would be so bad for Black. If White challenges Black to a capturing race with 'a', Black would win it with the sequence Black 'b'–White 'c'–Black 'd'.



Dia. 3



Dia. 4



Dia. 5

You mean that the game up to White 44 is unfavorable for Black?

Rin: 'Yes, the black group is heavy. After this, Black will try to gain territory at the bottom, but White will be able to get compensation for his loss there in other parts of the board as long as the black group remains heavy.'

Figure 3 (45–77). Black tries his hardest.

Black 47 is surprising. Is the group on the left all right?

Rin: 'The attack at White 1 in *Dia. 6* would not be effective. Black 2 and 4 would capture the stone at 1. If White 3 at 6, Black 'a' would capture the marked white stone.'

Does White peep at 54 to split up the black groups?

Rin: 'You mean with White 1 in *Dia. 7*? In response, Black would cut with 2 and 4 and

squeeze up to 12. The shape of these white stones is horrible; unless White were to capture the black stones on the left, the game would be over, but these stones could make life with the moves to 18 as well as with the exchange of Black 51 for 52. In fact, this exchange proves the sharpness of Kobayashi's skill. When it comes to a situation like this, he does that kind of thing well. I'm impressed.'






Figure 3 (45–77)



Dia. 6



Dia. 7

13: connects (above 1)

Figure 4 (78–100). Black cannot be optimistic.

After White 78 and 80, White temporarily ceased his attack and switched to the lower right corner.

Rin: 'If Black played 87 at 1 in *Dia. 8*, the sequence to White 8 would follow. White

would get such powerful thickness in the center that the black group on the left would find itself in big trouble when White plays 'a', because this group does not have an eye yet.'





Figure 4 (78-100)



Dia. 8

Up to 91, Black has no reason to be optimistic.

Rin: 'I was impressed by the way Ryu played in this figure. All of his moves are natural, without any undue exertion, but they are still scoring points. Most people would want to harass the black group with A or B as soon as possible. In contrast, Ryu does not make any of these aggressive moves, but restrains Black's moves instead. By the way, 97 and 99 are Black's privilege.'





Figure 5 (101-125)

Figure 5 (101-125). Is White playing slackly?

Rin: 'I question White 12. Up to Black 23, White made thickness. But in this position, his thickness does not work well. This means that he has suffered some territorial loss. If I were White, I would play 1 in Dia. 9, then either at 3 or 'a'. That way, White would not lose as much territory as he does in the game.'



Dia. 9

As a consequence of the skirmish in the upper right corner, Black's total territory has almost caught up with that of White's, including the *komi*.

Figure 6 (126-154). The worst timing

After 25, White rushes into the center with

26. Since Black 27 is an obvious counter move, White 26 appears to be in danger.

Rin: 'Playing White 26 at 31 would be safe. White then seems to be a little bit ahead.'





Figure 6 (126-154)

After the game, what Kobayashi regretted most was the timing of the cut at 49. He said, 'I should have played 43 at 49.'



Dia. 10

Rin: 'I see. If Black played 1 in Dia. 10, the sequence to 9 would follow, and . . . it seems that White would be behind?! Wait, the end-game is extremely difficult, and who is ahead would be very hard to determine.'

Let's just say that if Black cut, he might gain a slight edge over White.

When White takes Black 49 with 52 and jumps at 54, the game is over: White has won.




Figure 7 (155-200)

Figure 7 and 8 (155-272). The margin of victory widens.

When White plays 58, his lead becomes even greater.

White wins by 3 1/2 points.

(Kido, February 1996. Translated by Furuyama Kazunari.)




Figure 8 (201-272)

The 20th Kisei Title Match

Kobayashi Satoru vs. Cho Chikun



Some children watching the first game in Amsterdam. Are there any future champions in this audience?

'I've got to change!' Kobayashi Satoru blurted out right after he took the Kisei title from Cho Chikun last year. Even though he succeeded in winning the match' after six fiercely fought games, Kobayashi still strongly felt the need to change his go style.

'I have to change my attitude completely. I have to be more positive. If I have a choice to cut or not to cut, I will consider the cut first.' Kobayashi has repeatedly said this ever since he took the title last year.

Cho was always on his mind and, in the end, it was Cho who became the challenger for this year's Kisei title match.

On the other hand, Cho seemed to have lost his killer instinct last year. He used to be famous for always winning a won game, but throughout 1995 he let many of these games slip through his grasp. Even though he defended his Honinbo title, he lost both the Kisei and Oza titles. But at the end of last year, he seemed to have overcome his slump by beating Kato two games straight in the best-of-three playoff to become the Kisei challenger. Moreover, as of the end of February, he has an excellent record of 11 wins to 3 losses for 1996.

Cho also seems to have recognized a need

to change his attitude. As he said just before the start of the title match, 'In last year's Kisei title match, I became very emotional. I looked upon Satoru as a younger Kitani disciple, not strong enough to challenge me. But now I will have to change my attitude and have more respect for the players of the younger generations who will challenge me in the future.'

Game One

White: Cho Chikun Honinbo

Black: Kobayashi Satoru Kisei

Komi: 5 1/2 points; time: 8 hours each.

Played in Amsterdam on January 17-18, 1996.

The referee for this game was Takagi Shoichi 9-dan and the official commentator was Kataoka Satoshi 9-dan. Iwamoto Kaoru 9-dan also joined the entourage, since Amsterdam was one of the places in the world where he has founded a go center. It was clearly a city of special importance to him. Takemiya Masaki, the newly crowned Meijin, was there to do the commentary for the satellite TV program.




Figure 1 (1-23)

Figure 1 (1-23). Long-thought-out moves

Cho spent an hour and six minutes on White 8. As if to counter Cho's fighting spirit, Kobayashi fell into deep thought: he spent fifty nine minutes on Black 9. The seriousness of their concentration, which showed their determination to win this title match, pervaded the room.

What Kobayashi was thinking about was an invasion at A.

After the game, Takemiya Meijin joined the discussion and argued that Black A was inconceivable. Kobayashi had been working through all the variations resulting from A, yet despite his long strategic thinking, the moves to White 22 followed the standard joseki.

'Attaching at Black 23 has the right feeling,' claimed Kataoka.

Figure 2 (24-52). Cho's rhythm was disturbed.

While murmuring, 'Have I no courage?' Cho played the knight's move of White 26. Instead of 26, the cut at 28 might at first glance appear to be the natural move, but Black had the powerful response of Black A-White 30-Black B.

According to Takagi, 'White 26 might have been a change in Cho's original plan. Maybe Kobayashi expected the cut.'

Black 29 was played after one and a half hours of contemplation. What was Kobayashi thinking about? After the game, he said that

he was first going to jump to C instead of 29, but then he started worrying about various things and played 29. 'I should have been braver,' he regretted.





Figure 2 (24-52)

The ko fight ended with 41 and White 42 became the sealed move.

Kataoka: 'Up to 41, the position is advantageous for White, but the game is just beginning'.



Dia. 1

In spite of Kataoka's evaluation, White 42 was the losing move according to Cho. Whether or not it could really be called a losing move, it was less than brilliant and it caused Cho to go awry.

Cho claimed that White 1 in Dia. 1 was the

only move. If Black responds with 2, the sequence to White 7 would follow, making a mild game.

Around move 44, Cho's rhythm went utterly crazy. He chastised himself by saying, 'What an idiot I am. I can't think straight anymore!' While hitting his head many times, he moaned, 'I don't deserve to be called a go player.'

After the game, the first thing he said was: 'Instead of 44, I should have at least capped at D. That would have been a more active move. The pressing moves of 48 and 50 were also terrible.'

Kataoka: 'The reason why it is hard for White to find good moves is because of 42. Yet, if White played 52 at the central star point, the situation would not be as clearcut for Black as in the game. White 46 is also problematic. It could very likely become a target to attack and, in the process of escaping, White's moyo in the center might disappear.'





Figure 3 (53-85)


Figure 3 (53-85). A quick resignation

Kobayashi invaded the middle of White's moyo with 53, playing this and the subsequent moves with absolute confidence.

Instead of White 54, if White played 1 in Dia. 2, Black would easily be able to make *sabaki* with 2, 4, and 6. If Black, on the other hand, played 57 at 1 in Dia. 3, White would be able to forcibly counter with the moves to 10, which would be very dangerous for Black. That is why Black chose 57.



Dia. 2



Dia. 3

Black 59 and 61 impressed the professionals watching the game in the pressroom.

'I learned this way of making *sabaki* from my teacher Iwamoto,' said Kobayashi with a smile. They were decisive moves. With 61, which made Black 66, 63, and the extension to the left of Black 55 all *miai*, White's stones began to look thinner than Black's around here.

Black could have jumped at 66 instead of 63, but 63 and 65 were safe moves. As a result, Black linked up to the left side with 73 for a satisfactory result. From this point on, Black began to anticipate victory.

Black 75 was also a good move, taking advantage of White's thin shape. White had no choice but to strengthen his group with 76.

When Black took the biggest point on the board at 81, he got a clear lead.

Cho expanded his moyo in the center with 82 and 84, staking out a large territory, but resigned when he saw Black 85.

In the pressroom, the professionals expected the game to continue to the end because Black's lead was not all that big. Yet, Cho gave up quickly.

Kobayashi: 'With 85 I thought Black was a little ahead, but I didn't think that White would resign. The result would hinge on what would happen in the lower right corner. If nothing happened, Black would be ahead.'

Cho: 'This game was bad from the beginning to the end. I'm too weak; there was nothing I could do. On the second day, I played the worst possible moves.'

Cho's lamentation was certainly exaggeration, but the game started to tilt toward Kobayashi right after the second day's play had begun. Kobayashi made beautiful moves and smartly stepped into White's moyo, fully demonstrating his increased power developed over the past year.

Black wins by resignation.

(Go Weekly, January 30, 1996. Translated by Furuyama Kazunari.)

Game Two

White: Kobayashi Satoru Kisei

Black: Cho Chikun Honinbo

Played in Sumoto, Hyogo prefecture on January 31 and February 1, 1996.

Commentary by Ishida Yoshio 9-dan.

Figure 1 (1—7). Cho's innovative strategy

As Black Cho sometimes plays the *sanrensei* formation of 1-3-5. The moves up to White 6 have been played hundreds of times in professional games. But then Cho deviated from the normal course of the fuseki by attaching at 7.

Ishida: 'Black 7 is extremely rare. Cho is well-known for trying new things in the opening. I assume that he played Black 7 to open up a new frontier in fuseki. His strong will-power shows through in this move.'





Figure 1 (1—7)


Another reason Cho played Black 7 might be because he wanted to avoid the same pattern he played last year in the first game of the Oza title match against O Rissei, which he lost.

Ishida: 'The ordinary joseki resulting from Black 7 is White 1 and 3 in *Dia. 1*, but after 4 it is difficult for White to find a move which gives him a balanced position at the top and also helps him make an invasion on the right side. For example, if White defends against the cut at 'a' with 'b', his position at the top is not balanced. On the other hand, if White 'c', his position at the top is balanced, but, unlike White 'b', it lacks the power to invade the black moyo.'

During the post-mortem discussion, Kobayashi said that he expected Black to play 2 in *Dia. 2*, followed by the sequence to 6. White would gain thickness.



Dia. 1



Dia. 2

Kobayashi: 'I used to like making thick positions, but now I'm not sure if thickness is more reliable than territory.'

Ishida: 'Whether those white stones become thick or heavy would depend on how White plays. It is understandable that Kobayashi would not want to play the sequence in *Dia. 2* because he now seems to favor territory over thickness.'

After thinking for a short time, Kobayashi played a move which threw the game into unknown territory and led to a fierce fight.




Figure 2 (8-27)

Figure 2 (8-27). The 'Chinshinto' tesuji

The fight resulting from White 8 was unbelievable. From this point on, the professionals watching the game in the pressroom were predicting that the game would end on the first day.


Ishida: 'If Black connected at 12 instead of 11, the joseki to White 12 in *Dia. 3* would follow. Professionals think that in general this joseki is good for White because he gains a lot of territory in the corner. Moreover, in this position the ladder at 'a' is unfavorable for Black.'

Instead of 12, White 1 in *Dia. 4* would be the safe way of playing.


Ishida: 'Kobayashi would not play safely as in *Dia. 4*; after all, he was the one who challenged Cho to a fight with White 8. *Dia. 4* would be a retreat from his original intention.'

It seems as if Black wanted to play 13 at 18, but with the sequence to 6 in *Dia. 5*, White would take both the upper and right sides, so this would be unfavorable for Black. Besides, the three black stones in the center could be-


come a target for White to attack. Therefore, Black seems to have no choice but to play 13 and 15 as in the game. They are indeed the strongest response.



Dia. 3




Dia. 4



Dia. 5

Ishida: 'I wonder whether Cho had already examined this pattern before the game.' What about White 14 at 1 in *Dia. 6*?




Dia. 6

5: takes ko; 7: connects

Ishida: 'If Black had to answer White 3 by connecting, this would be a fancy forcing move. But Black would answer with pragmatic moves at 4 and 6. Because White would not have any ko threats, he would have to give up the ko fight, which results from the cut at 8 after Black 6, and connect the ko with 7, Black would then connect at 8. White gets a


thick position at the top, but he would not be able to use this thickness effectively, since Black has already played 4 and 6.'




Dia. 7

Playing Black 15 at 1 in Dia. 7 would produce almost the same result as in Dia. 5.


Instead of 16, White 1 in Dia. 8 is one way to make *sabaki*. After White 1 and 3, if 5 and 7 worked, this *sabaki* would be successful. However, after Black 16, White would not be able to capture the marked black stone with 'a', so he would not play this variation.



Dia. 8



Dia. 9



Dia. 10

White 16 is a tesuji.

Ishida: 'An alternative to White 16 would be the sequence to White 5 in Dia. 9. The reason White exchanged 16 for Black 17 is that with the exchange of White 'a' for Black 'b', the ladder starting with Black 4 wouldn't work, so the two white stones have some *aji* there.

Cho is a player who does not submit to his opponent's demands. He refuses to accept the inferior result of Dia. 9 by playing the hane at 21. Now the continuation up to 26 is inevitable. After White 26, the two ladders at White A and 1 in Dia. 10 become *miai*, and Black 27 is the only move which simultaneously blocks both ladders. Such a tesuji is called 'Chinshinto'.





Figure 3 (28-64)

Figure 3 (28-64). A 15-point loss


The life-and-death problem called 'Chinshinto' appears in the classic Chinese problem book *Gengen Gokyo*.

In response to this fancy tesuji, White 28 is the best move. If White plays 1 in Dia. 11, Black grabs the three vital white stones at the top right with the tesuji of 4 and 6, and White can not make a thick position outside. Black plays 29 with the intention of sacrificing all four of his stones together so as to squeeze the white stones from the outside, making a big territory on the right side. This is exactly what happens in the game.

Ishida: 'Instead of Black 29, playing 1 in Dia. 12 would enable Black to capture the three important white stones in the corner. White would get a *ponnuki* with 10 and, after 12, he could capture the three black stones by throwing in at 'a'. This result would be more than satisfactory for White. There is no comparison between this and Dia. 11.




Dia. 11



Dia. 12

By the way, if it were possible to play 7 at 9 in *Dia. 12*, that would be great for Black, but again the throw-in at White 'a' would capture the three black stones.



Dia. 13


When White plays 36 in the game, some readers might wonder why Black doesn't play 37 at 38 and try to capture the three white stones with the sequence to 13 in *Dia. 13*. The reason is that White would counter with 14 and 16. Now, there is burdensome *aji* at White 'a', so Black cannot capture these stones unconditionally.

With the sequence to Black 43, the shape is settled. According to Kobayashi, White has lost about fifteen points.

Ishida: 'It is true that Black is in the lead, but I question White 46 more than the white moves before 45. Just making the normal two-space extension at A, followed by Black 47 and White B, would make the game more viable for White.'

White plays 52 to see Black's response before deciding his next move. Playing 55 at 62 would kill all the white stones there, so it would be territorially more profitable.

Ishida: 'Black must have disliked White's forcing move at 2 in *Dia. 14*, but with the extension to 5, it seems to me that the result would not be unsatisfactory for Black. When Black plays 55, it shows that he is intent on capturing all the stones on the right side.'



Dia. 14




Figure 4 (65-93)

68: takes ko (left of 65); 71: takes ko at 65;
73: connects ko (left of 65)

Figure 4 (65-93). Typical of Cho Chikun


In the moves from 56 to 64 in *Figure 3*, White starts a ko on the right side. Black finishes the ko fight by connecting at 73 and letting White take three of his stones with 72 and 74. Black then extends to 75 at the bottom.

Ishida: 'The result of this ko fight is even. That is, Black still retains the lead he got in the fight in the upper right. Still, Black should have ended the ko immediately after White played 66 so that White would not be able to add the stone at White 70. Although this stone appears worthless, it will help White's stones make life at the bottom later on.'

Since White can make life for his group at the bottom right, shouldn't Black have played 75 at A?

Ishida: 'A move like 75 is typical of Cho Chikun. It seems that he intentionally plays 75, as if he were asking his opponent to start another game from here or to open up a new scene of battle.'

Black 77 and 79 are very instructive. Even though it is enticing to severely attack the white stones at the bottom immediately, playing mildly like this could be a safer way to clinch the game. Even so, Cho's next moves are dubious.



Dia. 15

Ishida: 'Up to 93, Black has been missing the right move to wrap up the game. Black should play 87 at 1, followed by 2 and 3, in Dia. 15. Black B rather than 89 is also the bigger point. When White wedges in on the left side with 90 and 92, the game begins to look a little promising for White.'

Figure 5 and 6 (94–191). Kobayashi lets his chance slip away.

Ishida: 'The game is beginning to tilt toward Kobayashi. Maybe because of this, Kobayashi might have breathed a sigh of relief and let his chance slip away. White 94 is a regrettable mistake. He should have either separated the black groups with White A or jumped to 95 to strengthen his stones on the left. White 95 would also erase the black moyo in the center. If this happened, it would still be difficult to say who would win, but Black might eke out a tiny lead.'




Figure 5 (94–127)




Figure 6 (128–191)

61: takes ko (above 48); 64: takes ko

Black 95 is an excellent point and Black 111 clinches the game. Instead of 114, White 118 would lead to the exchange of Black B for White C, followed by Black 114. The white group would probably die. Up to 124, White has gained nothing and has only succeeded in escaping. During that time, Black has made a large territory in the center, with no bad *aji*.

This was a powerful and exciting game, the likes of which we rarely see these days. Cho won this game without making any retreat. It was a big victory for him.

Black wins by resignation.

(Kido, March 1996. Translated by Furuyama Kazunari.)



Both Cho and Kobayashi seem amused at the outcome of the second game.

Game Three

White: Cho Chikun Honinbo

Black: Kobayashi Satoru Kisei

Played on February 7-8, 1996, in Kanazawa.

Commentary by Sakata Eio 9-dan.

Report by Murakami Akira.

Black 5 to White 8. White probably played 8 because an ordinary move might give Black a chance to take the initiative. White 8 might also have resulted from Cho's fighting spirit, hoping to dampen Kobayashi's enthusiasm toward this game.





Figure 1 (1-36)

Figure 1 (1-36). It's not a question of logic.

Sakata: Approaching White 4 inside the white *nirensai* at 5 is unusual. It seems as if Black is eager to try a something new. I have never seen a fuseki with the formation from



Dia. 1

For example, instead of White 8, answering with 1 in *Dia. 1* might result in Black playing 2 and 4. After 10, Black 'b' is the perfect answer to White 'a'; if White 'c', then Black would respond with 'd'. Either way the marked stone is in a good position. If White plays 5 at 'e', Black will play 7. These days the black stones would be considered thick and

good for Black, unlike the way people used to think of them. Actually, Kobayashi and Cho are making moves based on their fighting spirit, not on whether the moves are good or bad. It's not a question of logic.

Murakami: After White played 12, Black made a *sanrensei* on the right with 13. That was rather surprising.

S: I have never encountered a fuseki like this. I have no idea who has the advantage. Even if White takes the whole left side as his territory, Black still has a viable game, since he has five stones staking out a position throughout the whole board, while White is concentrated on the left side.

M: In response to White 14, Black also played a one-space pincer at 15.

S: It does not seem to have any profound meaning either. Each move shows their fighting spirit and they are confident about their moves. Again, it is not a question of logic.

M: In answer to White 22, Black again played a one-space pincer. One-space pincers have now appeared in all four corners.

S: Yes, but this time invading at the 3-3 point in the lower right corner and playing the same joseki as the upper right corner would lead to a favorable result for Black.




Figure 2 (37-68)
59: connects at 56

Figure 2 (37-68). Powerful moves one after another


S: The location of White 42 is perfect. That's the proper way to pincer.

M: Black 47 was said to be very severe. However, some professionals claimed that Black 47 at 62 was a more balanced move.

S: But in this case I would also be inclined to play 47. The reason is that White has omitted a defensive move at 60 or A, so Black is aiming at this point.

M: In response to White 48, Black 49 is also a powerful move, isn't it?

S: It would be safe for White to clamp at 52 instead of playing 48, but it's a thin and submissive move, not to mention cowardly. Black could easily link up his stone at 47 to his allies on the right.



Dia. 2

Actually, there is one thing I don't understand. Instead of White 50, why didn't White play 1 in Dia. 2 to keep the black stones from linking up? Up to 13, it is not bad for White. If Black plays 6 at 'a', White can jump to 11 or play at 8; this looks good for White, too. Maybe Cho was afraid that Black would play 6 at 8.

M: White played the forcing moves from 54 to 60 was so he wouldn't have to connect at B in answer to Black 61. After 61, White could force only if he connected at B.

S: With White 64 and 66, Cho got influence in the center. For Black to simply capture the white stone with B does not generate any influence, so it is understandable that he would jump into the center with 65 and 67.

M: What do you think of the result to 68?

S: White has gained a lot of influence toward the center, but I think Black has gained more overall.

Figure 3 (69-100). A blunder

M: Kobayashi's greatest regret was 73.

S: How is it possible that he didn't consider White's response at 74?

M: Maybe he had a misconception about

the automatic exchange of Black 73 for 74.

S: The timing of 73 was also bad. If Black had played 69 at 73, White would have to cut at A, for answering at 74 would let Black invade at 72.





Figure 3 (69-100)

M: Is it possible for Black to connect at A instead of 75?

S: That's impossible. In *Dia. 3*, White would respond with 2 and 4, forcing Black to retreat by capturing with 5. White would then extend to 6.



Dia. 3

M: You mean that Black 73 might become trapped with no compensation?

S: Black cannot connect at A immediately, and White 74 has a lot of influence in the

center. Worst of all, White ends in sente, so the exchange of Black 73 for White 74 was a huge loss. Without this exchange, Black would have had a forcing move at 74, so he could have omitted 75 and turned to the right side first. Retreating to 75 was extremely painful. The loss amounts to half a move . . . no more than half a move.

M: White finally took the lead by invading at 76.

S: Black's blunder at 73 caused him to do something to rectify it, so instead of making the usual response at 79 to White 76, Kobayashi attached at 77. Yet the situation became worse. Black 77 made White connect at 80, but because of this connection, White 82 became an awesome forcing move. Without Black 85, White 85-Black B-White C would rob the black group of its eyes. Without the exchange of Black 77 for 80, White would not be entitled to make his corner territory so big by playing 82. When White made life on the right side with 100, the prospects for Black became very negative.




Figure 4 (101-126)

Figure 4 (101-126). *Throwing away life insurance*

S: Black 7 is impossible: Black A is the appropriate move here. But since Black was behind, he wanted to tempt White into playing severely so as to punish Black for his overplays. And the more severe White's moves are, the more they might stray from safety, thereby making the game more com-

plicated and entangled, increasing the chances that Black will make mistakes.


M: White certainly may have been tempted; is that why he played 8?

S: White should have played 8 at B, followed by Black 14 and White C. This would be good for White.

M: By exchanging Black 21 for 22, Black lost his life insurance, right?

S: If Black didn't play that exchange, he could play 1 and 3 in *Dia. 4* and either link up to his group on the left side by playing at 4 or make two eyes by capturing White's stones in the corner with Black 5. There is a nice tesuji to reduce Black's group to one eye with White 'a', Black 'b', then White 'a', but in this case the white group on the right side would lose its two eyes and die. After White plays 26, the tesuji reemerges, so the black group is no longer secure.

M: So that means Black 21 was a mistake?



S: Oh, no. Without it White may very well play the forcing move at D. Even a small loss would be painful for Black who is far behind.

M: Without White 26, Black would wedge in at 26 and kill the white group. But before 26, Cho made a forcing move at 24.

S: That was an astute move. If Black played 1 in *Dia. 5*, White could escape Black's encirclement with 2 and 4, then make life with 6. After this, if Black 'a', White 'b'; if Black 'c', White 'd' would prevent Black from trapping the white stones.

Figure 5 (127-154). Into chaos

S: Black 35 was an all-out move. Without it, Black would have no chance. The black group in the lower right corner doesn't have

two eyes. Still, Black was trying to kill either the white group in the center or the one on the bottom side.





Figure 5 (127-154)

M: Was White also trying to kill the black group?

S: It's not exactly necessary... Black 41 was the only move. If Black played 43 instead of 41, White would push through at A and capture Black 35.

M: I've heard that White should have retreated around 48.



Dia. 6

S: That's right. He should have retreated to 1 in *Dia. 6*. White would then be ahead, wouldn't he? Black's cut at 'a' instead of 2

would not work because of White 'b'–Black 'c'–White 'd'. Cho was in *byo-yomi*, so it would be difficult to remain calm and choose *Dia. 6*.

M: When Black peeped at 49, the game was thrown into chaos.

S: White's stones are the ones which are now reeling. White 54 would usually be a forcing move since White A, then White B, would reduce Black's territory considerably.

M: So Black secured his big group.




Figure 6 (155-168)

Figure 6 (155-168). *Missing the long-awaited chance*

S: White 60 should have been the losing move. It should have been played at 62, followed by Black 60 and White 64 and White would still have been in the lead. Cho was in *byo-yomi*, so that is probably why he made this mistake.

M: Black 61 was the problematic move.


S: If Black played 1 in *Dia. 7*, the game would be over. Interestingly enough, Black wins both of the two capturing races by one move. The first race begins with White 4 to Black 25. Even though White has a tesuji at 14 and 16, Black ataris at 17 and 21, thereby getting an extra liberty.

S: The other capturing race starts when White plays 4 at 'a', followed by Black 'b', White 'c', Black 'd', White 'e', and Black 'f'.

M: You mean that the six white stones in the center could have been captured?

S: If that happened, Black would answer White 64 with Black A–White 68–Black B.

Even if he sacrificed the marked stone, he would still win.



Dia. 7

M: He sure missed an excellent chance.

S: Satoru tried very hard to reverse this lost game. When he finally created a chance . . . How could he let it slip away?

M: He still had more than an hour left on his clock.

S: Answering White 64 with A would lose.




Figure 7 (169-216)

74, 77, 80, 83, 86, 89, 92, 95, 98, 101: take ko (around 71); 105: connects (left of 71)

Figure 7 (169-216). *The ko fails to explode.*

M: I couldn't help noticing the left side. But, as I can see in the game, both White 70 and White 88 will solve White's problem in answer to Black 69 and 87.



With his victory in the third game, Cho is well on the way to taking back the Kisei title he lost last year.


S: Because Black ataried at 97, the game was over. White no longer had to fight the ko and he could link up with 102, 104, and 106. Black 97 was a simple mistake.

M: What would happen if Black connected at 1 in *Dia. 8* instead of 97?

Black has to continue fighting this ko and try to kill the white group. The chances that Black could do this are extremely slim. After this, there is no way that Black can stage an upset.

White wins by resignation.

(Kido, April 1996. Translated by Furuyama Kazunari.)



Dia. 8

5: takes ko (left of 2)

S: It probably wouldn't work, but he should have tried it. After Black takes the ko with 5, White might play something like 6. If Black then connected the ko, the white group on the side could live with 'a'. Therefore,

Game Four

White: Kobayashi Satoru Kisei

Black: Cho Chikun Honinbo

Played on February 21–22, 1996, in Kitakyushu City.

Commentary by Kobayashi Koichi 9-dan.

Beyond Good or Bad


I went to the fourth game as a commentator along with the referee Otake Hideo 9-dan and two game recorders, Okada Yumiko 3-dan and my daughter, Izumi 1-dan. I was most likely asked to help out so that I could give moral support for Izumi, since it was the first time she had ever acted as a recorder for a two-day game.

It has been a long time since I have worked as a commentator. Over the last several years I have been playing in the title matches until I lost the Meijin title last October. I'd rather be

playing, but . . . Then I was also asked to comment on this game for *Kido*. Again, it has been a long time since I have done this. In addition to what the players said, I will also tell you my feelings about this game.

The first thing I'd like to say is that this was the crucial game. It has often been said that after a score of 2-2 in a seven-game match, the fifth game is crucial. But, in fact, it is often the fourth game which is crucial, for it determines whether the player who is behind can even the score or the player who is ahead can widen his lead. I say this from my own experience.

The players must also have felt this way, for they played cautiously. The slow pace of the game reflected this caution. Only 27 moves were played on the first day and 39 moves up to the lunch break on the second day. According to the Yomiuri newspaper reporters, there has not been a best-of-seven game where so few moves were played on the first day for ten years.



Reference diagram

Even though their fighting spirit was strong, this doesn't necessarily make for a masterpiece. Both sides made several serious mistakes. For example, Satoru cut at 2 in the diagram above and pushed through with 4 and 6. I can understand why he did this, but I don't think they were good moves. Yet, one thing is certain: it was a fiercely fought game.

Figure 1 (1-28). Several questionable moves

Cho is a player who can handle any fuseki style. Even so, it seems unusual to see him try

the old 'Kobayashi style' with Black 1, 3, 5, and 7. Perhaps he played this fuseki because I stimulated him into trying something different from what he usually does. He might have remembered our games when he sat down and played my old style.





Figure 1 (1-28)

In response to White 8, Black 9 is occasionally played instead of 22. This emphasizes the moyo at the bottom when Black pushes at 11 and covers at 13. Satoru responded with 14 and 16. White 1, 3, and 5 in *Dia. 1* are the usual moves. Black would then jump to 6 and White plays either 7 or 'a'. White 7 forestalls Black's shoulder hit at 'b'.




Dia. 1

Satoru certainly must have thought about *Dia. 1*, but he tried 14 and 16 perhaps because

he wanted to avoid letting Black make a moyo at the bottom. Nonetheless, White suffered a loss (he ends up with bad shape) when Black played 17. Because of this, not many professionals would play this variation. I would choose *Dia. 1* as well. Satoru was probably aware that he would be criticized for playing these moves, but he played them anyway.

Next, Cho's fondness for territory astonished me. Going for territory with Black 21 seems to be going too far. Black's fuseki has suddenly slowed down. I'd play as in *Dia. 2*. Was Cho afraid of being forced by White 2? But when Black descends to 3, White has to jump to 4 to avoid Black's blockade at 'a'. Black then defends at 5. I think this was possible. My go style is often said to be territory-oriented, but seeing Black 21, don't you think Cho's territorial instinct is more extreme than mine? But I must say that all professionals start out favoring territory.



Dia. 2

Black 21 allows White to play 24. In response, Cho connected at 25. I'd prefer Black A. If White played 26, as in the game, Black would link up with B. I think the combination of Black A and B is better than Black 25 and 27 in the game.

Figure 2 (28–39). Crossing swords

White 28 was the sealed move; it was the only move. Black peeped at 29, then defended at 31. In answer to White 32, Black attached at 33. A fierce skirmish ensues, but the situation

settles down when Black plays 39. I think the result is even, but some professionals said that it is better for Black. However, the cut of 36 and 38 is bigger than it looks.






Figure 2 (28–39)

In response to White 34, Black 35 is good style. If Black plays 1 and 3 in *Dia. 4* instead, Black would seem to have set up a ladder. But White peeps at 4, and Black can only link up his stones with the moves to 13. This way of linking up is humiliating for Black. Besides, he ends up with bad shape. Professionals never play moves like these.



Dia. 4



Dia. 5

In contrast, instead of playing White 36, the sequence in *Dia. 5* would be painful for White. Even though White captures the six stones, Black hits the head of the two white stones with 6. Worse, the upper right corner could become Black's territory without any more moves. Usually, it is necessary to play another move under a corner star point to the secure the corner territory.

For all these reasons, the result to Black 39 is pretty well balanced.

In retrospect, if Black played 33 at 35, White would attach at A. This doesn't look good, so Black chose 33. Moreover, if White 34 at 37, Black would strengthen his stones by playing 35 at 34. Then the stone at White 28 would be attacked from all sides. Therefore, White played 34. White 36 breaks the ladder threatening the stone at 34. As we can see, there are good reasons for all the moves in this figure.




Figure 3 (40-56)

Figure 3 (40-56). Misreading the fight


Up until the lunch break on the second day, the players spent a lot of time reading out as many variations as they could. It is not a very pleasant experience for the players; it involves a lot of stress. I know, as I experienced this many times in the title matches I fought. As the commentator, it was very easy for me to simply explain their moves.

I didn't expect White 40. Even if Black blocks with 41, White can still invade at the 3-3 point. I thought White would play at A instead or take a big point somewhere else.


As an alternative, connecting at 1 in *Dia. 6* is bad. Up to Black 6, White will not lose his stones, but he ends up with a clump of stones. Besides, Black 'a' is now a forcing move.

Actually, Satoru misread this position. He didn't consider Black's counter moves at 43, 45, and 47 in answer to the crosscut of White 42 and 44. If Black played 1 in *Dia. 7*, White

could easily settle his stones up to 6. But Black's counter moves here were very severe; White did not have a better response than the ones he played in the game, which he'd rather not play. Even after White 54, the white group on the upper right side is not secure, but now White had to play 56 or his group on the lower right side would be without eyes. However, it is Black's turn to make a mistake.



Dia. 6



Dia. 7

Figure 4 (57-74). Black's misreading

First, look at the result in this figure. Up to White 74, the white group is alive because he can make his second eye at either A or B, so this figure is a great success for White. How did this happen?

Black 57 was Cho's mistake. He didn't see the move at 62 which enabled White to make *sabaki*. As a result, Black lost his advantage.




Figure 4 (57-74)


61: connects (above 57); 72: connects (at 67)

In order to stop White from making *sabaki*, Black should have extended to 1 in *Dia. 8* instead of Black 57. Up to 7, Black could take



Second guessing Satoru and Cho. From left to right at the go board, Otake Hideo, Kobayashi Koichi, and Ryu Shikun Tengen analysing the fourth game in the pressroom.


the territory at the top while attacking the white group; this is an ideal development. On the right, Black would answer at White 'a' with 'b', and White can only make one eye for his group in gote.




Dia. 8

Again White's 62 and 64 were good moves. Black would rather play 67 at 73, but he can't do that. Maybe that's what Cho didn't see, so he mistakenly ataried at 57. Satoru, on the other hand, probably read out all the variations correctly, so here, at least, his analysis was superior to Cho's.

Cho had to play 67 because if he played 1 in *Dia. 9*, White would play 2, 4, and 6, ignoring Black's cut at 'a'. When Black cut at 7, White would start a ko with 8. White would have a ko threat at 'b', but Black doesn't have a single one anywhere on the board. Therefore, the result would be good for White.



Dia. 9



Dia. 10

Even if Black cut at 1 in *Dia. 10*, White would atari at 2, then capture a black stone at 4. Black doesn't gain as much as White.

For all these reasons, even though Black doesn't want to cut at 67 and give the white group eyes, Black didn't really have a choice. With 74, White successfully got two eyes, without losing much. I wouldn't say the situation was tilting toward White, but at least the damage he sustained as a result of his dubious move at 40 was wiped out by Black 57. As *Dia. 8* shows, White should have been in big trouble.

Figure 5 (75–88). Cho's reflection

Although I'm only pointing to moves, which I believe are problematic, thrilling fights are taking place. The players were putting out their best efforts. As a result, an exciting game was being created.





Figure 5 (75-88)


The white moves from 76 to 80 could have been the losing moves, but Black missed his chance to wrap up the game by playing 81.

White let Black make a *ponnuki* with 79, then pushed through with 80. Although it is common sense to avoid allowing your groups to be confined and shut out of the center, in this case all of Black's bad *aji* disappeared when he played 79. Instead of 76, White 1 and 3 in *Dia. 11* would create many cutting points in Black's position. Connecting at 4 seems natural, but then the attachment at White 5 becomes a *tesuji*. If Black 6 and 8, White links up with 9, then jumps to 11. Black needs to protect his cutting point at 'a' with 12, then White plays 13; the white stones at the top are efficiently making territory.



Dia. 11

Instead of Black 8 in *Dia. 11*, Black might play 1 in *Dia. 12*. White would then squeeze with 2 and 4, after which White makes good shape with 6 and Black still needs to protect the cutting point at 'a'.




Dia. 12

5: connects

After White 80, Black let his chance slip away. The forcing move of White 82 was painful for Black. As a result, the game is even again.

Black played 81 to completely secure the black group on the right side, but territorially it was small. After the game, Cho reflected on it and said that Black 1 in *Dia. 13* was the only move. I agree with him. Black 1 in *Dia. 13* clearly takes advantage of White's mistake at 76, 78, and 80.



Dia. 13

The black group on the right side is not so worrisome. Even if White cut it off by playing 2, Black could defend with 3. A nice thing about this variation is that Black's atari at 'a' may force White to answer at 'b', followed by Black 'c', another forcing move. This means that the black group would almost have eyes, so he would not have to worry about it. If White were to answer Black 'a' with White 'c', Black 'b' would threaten the entire white group. Note that in *Dia. 11* White would play a stone at 3, so White's eye situation there is different from *Dia. 13*.

I would not praise Black 85 either. I'd play 85 at 88; White's cutting sequence White A-Black B-White C is scary.





Figure 6 (89-115)

Figure 6 (89-115). It could have been the losing move.


I was shocked when I saw Black 89. This move shows Cho's confidence that he had enough points to win. If he lost, however, this move would be severely criticized, so it was brave for him to play there. The usual move would be at A.



Dia. 14 8: connects (at 5)

Satoru later regretted White 92: 'It should have been at 113.' Playing 92, however, gave White a chance, but, unfortunately, Satoru didn't grab it. If White had followed the sequence in *Dia. 14*, White would have ended in sente and would have been able to play at 113. The game would then have been over. Instead of 14, Black could not counter with 1 in *Dia. 15*. Up to White 16, the capturing race is in Black's favor, so Black would have to follow *Dia. 14*. Yet the overall situation is that Black may be behind not even counting the komi he gives White. Even after Black 105, White

could have played *Dia. 14*. Cho's mistake was Black 103; he should have played this move at B.



Dia. 15





Figure 7 (116-143)



Dia. 16


Figure 7 (116-143). A neat ending

When Black played 111 and 113, he got a clear lead, but White kept trying to upset the situation with White 118 to 124. Cho responded to White 122 with 123, but Black 1 in *Dia. 16* was also a clearcut way to win. With the sequence from 2, White could break through Black's territory at the bottom. This

not only gives Black a *ponnuki* with 9, which thickens the center, but also a forcing move at 15. Black then makes territory there with 17. Besides, Black 'a' is also a forcing move, so the two marked white stones are as good as captured.

White's final make-or-break move could be at 33 instead of White 32. This variation is shown in *Dia. 18*.

In reply to White 36, Black 37 was the winning move. Because of this sacrifice, Black 41 became possible. If White cut at 1 in *Dia. 17* instead of 42, Black would have the tesuji of 6; Black 'a' and 'b' would become *miai*. Without the exchange of Black 37 for 38, White could cut off Black 41 at 43. If Black then plays 37, White would retreat to A. In the game, if White played 38 at A, Black would be satisfied with reducing White's territory. He would then turn his attention to the reduction of White's moyo in the center.



Dia. 17





Figure 8 (144-266)

134, 137, 140, 146, 149, 152, 155, 158, 161, 164:
take ko around 129; 166: connects at 129

Figure 8 (144-266). The Kisei at kadoban

I have looked at the moves in this figure carefully and I have determined that the last possible chance for an upset was in *Figure 7*.

The move I did not comment on in the last figure was White 32. White 1 in *Dia. 18* instead separates the two black stones from their allies at the bottom. Yet this move seems to be ineffective. Black would directly answer it with 2 and 4; as a result of his weakness at 'a', White does not appear to be able to capture the black stones. Up to 16, Black has taken up a position in the center. Black 'b' is now a forcing move which gives his group eye shape. In any case, he will either get eyes or link up with his allies on the right.



Dia. 18


In this game, the players fought very tenaciously. Even though there were many mistakes, it was still an exciting game. Overall, it seemed to flow towards Black, but this doesn't mean that Satoru didn't have a chance; in fact, he had many. Perhaps those missed chances will make Satoru fight even harder in the next game.

Black wins by 1 1/2 points.

(Kido, April 1996. Translated by Furuyama Kazunari.)


At the time we went to press the commentaries for Games Five to Seven were not yet available. We will present them in our next issue.

Ten Easy Problems: Answers




Problem 1

If Black plays 1, White is unable to play at 'a' because he would be left without any liberties; i.e., he would be committing suicide, which is illegal.




Problem 2

Black must be careful in which direction he ataris. Black 1 and 3 are the correct way. Black 1 at 2 will enable White to kill the black group by descending to 1.




Problem 3

Black should descend with 1. White must play 2 to destroy Black's second eye, but the atari of 3 captures three white stones, enabling Black to get his second eye.




Problem 4

Black 1 is the vital point. If White captures a stone at 2, Black 3 makes two eyes. If White 2 at 3, Black 3 at 2 also makes two eyes.




Problem 5

Black 1 follows the same idea as Problem 4. If White 2 at 3, Black gets two eyes by playing 3 at 2.




Problem 6

After Black makes an eye with 1 and 3, White can't separate Black's stones because he is short of liberties.




Problem 7

Throwing in with 1 is the tesuji. When White captures with 2, Black's group can live if he wins the ko starting with 3.




Problem 8

Black 1 is the vital point for making two eyes. If White tries to destroy Black's second eye with 2, he will find himself short of liberties after Black 5.



Problem 9

Black should descend to 1. If White plays 2, Black blocks with 3 and the best White can do is to make a *seki* with 4, so Black lives.



Problem 10


Black should cut at 1, then hane with 3. (White can't capture 1 because of a snap-back.) After White defends with 4, Black makes two eyes with 5.

New Moves and New Josekis

by Abe Yoshiteru


Takemiya's Attachment

The position in the figure below appeared in a game played between Takemiya Masaki (Black), and Cho Hun-hyun on February 22nd, 1994, in the 2nd Jinro Cup, a knockout tournament among three five-player teams from Japan, China, and Korea.



Reference Diagram

The attachment of White 1 in the reference diagram is Takemiya's new move. It simplifies the position throughout the board.




Dia. 1

Dia. 1 (The initial moves)

The two-space high pincer at 2 is quite fashionable these days and new patterns are constantly arising in professional games.

In response to a double approach at 3, the usual move these days is to attach at 4. The




Dia. 2

follow-up after Black 5 and 7 was never given a second thought.

Dia. 2 (The follow-up)

White 1 was regarded as the only move. Black would push at 2, and White would attach at 3.




Dia. 3

Dia. 3 (Emphasizing the center)

To prevent Black from breaking out into the center, blocking at 1 is also possible. Next, whether Black pushes through at 'a' and cuts or crawls at 'b' depends on the position.


This pattern still needs further investigation.



Dia. 4

Dia. 4 (What happened in the game)

Instead of blocking as in *Dia. 2*, White attached at 1. Black crawled with 2, preventing White from playing on this point. White 3 now enables White to respond strongly with 'b' when Black plays 'a'. To break out into the center, Black has to make a crude move at 'c'.



Dia. 5

Dia. 5 (Reversion)


Instead of Black 2 in *Dia. 4*, if Black plays the hane of 1, following the proverb 'respond to an attachment with a hane,' White will block with 2. Up to White 8, this reverts to a typical pattern created by the sequence White

2-Black 3-White attaches (below Black 1)-
Black 1-White 4-Black 5-White 6-Black 7-
White 8.

Dia. 6 (Alternative to the black hane)

If White doesn't like the outcome in *Dia. 5*, he can block from the other side with 2. Black ataris with 3 and slides to 5.

In this pattern, Black hesitates to push at 6 instead of 5, so it seems as if Black has to let White block from the outside with 6. Therefore, Black plays a fast-paced move by extending to 7.



Dia. 6


Dia. 7

Dia. 7 (Little pressure)

Instead of White 3 in *Dia. 4*, descending to White 1 is a bad move. Black further encroaches into the corner with 2, and White 1 puts little pressure on the black stone above. After 2, White can't defend against both of the severe black moves at 'a' and 'b'.

Dia. 8 (Blocking on the outside)

Blocking on the outside with White 1 (instead of White 3 in *Dia. 4*) is also a bad move. For example, if Black pushes through at 2 and 4, White cannot cut at 'a'.



Dia. 8

Dia. 9

Dia. 9 (An Alternative)

After White 3 in *Dia. 4*, the shape seems to be settled. After Takemiya played 1 in the reference diagram, this move was played in

several other games and a new pattern was created each time.

Other important variations are for Black to invade the 3-3 point at 'a' and to push through at 'b'. I will explain these later.

Figure 1 (1-15). Takemiya vs. Cho

Black did not have any good follow-up moves in the lower left corner after White 14, so he jumped into the left side with 15 in order to stop White from making a moyo there.




Figure 1 (1-15)

Figure 2 (16-24). Takemiya vs. Cho

White played 16 to drive Black into his thickness. Black extended to 17, hoping for a chance to descend to 'a'. With 20, 22, and 24, White began to build a moyo in the upper left. White eventually won by 3 1/2 half points.




Figure 2 (16-24)

Figure 1A (1-19)

A month after the Takemiya-Cho game, Rin Kaiho (White) and Cho Hun-hyun followed *Dia. 6* up to 19 in the 7th Fujitsu Cup.




Figure 1A (1-19)

Figure 2A (20-29)

White wouldn't get a good result if Black connected at 24, so he invaded at 20. Before White 24, Rin later claimed that he should have exchanged White 'a' for Black 'b'. Black eventually won by resignation.




Figure 2A (20-29)

Figure 1B (1-29)

This game comes from the 19th Meijin league between Awaji Shuzo 9-dan (White) and Cho Chikun. In response to White 12, Black invaded the 3-3 point with 13 and an unexpected sequence emerged.




Figure 1B (1-29)

Figure 2B (30-43)

White gained thickness while Black took territory. When White ataried at 42, he had played two more stones than Black around here, so the result was not really satisfactory for him. But White still won by half a point.






Figure 2B (30-43)




Dia. 10 (The departure point)

In the Awaji-Cho game, I will refer to Black 9 in *Dia. 10* as the departure point and examine the follow-up moves.



Dia. 11



Dia. 12


Dia. 11 (What happened in the game: 1)

White played 1 to close off the center while Black enlarged his corner with 2. White 3 and 5 were probes to see how White would respond, but Black didn't really have any other good move apart from the connection at 6.


Dia. 12 (Black's demand)

Rather than playing 1 in *Dia. 11*, White may feel that 1 here is more attractive. But Black pushes through at 2 and 4, then connects at 6, forcing White to fight.

In this game, White occupies the 3-3 point in the lower left corner, so even if White extends to 'a', he cannot expect to develop a moyo on the left. Besides, once Black extends to 'b', the fight will take place in Black's sphere of influence. The position of the marked black stone is also better than 'c'.



Dia. 13




Dia. 14

Dia. 13 (The weakness of the 3-3 point)


Instead of Black 2 in *Dia. 11*, the hane of Black 1 would allow White to block at 2; this is not good for Black. If Black 5, White attacks Black's group with a pincer at 6. If Black plays elsewhere on the left side instead of Black 5, White can aim at the sequence White 'a'–Black 'b'–White 'c' to attack the black group at the top.

Dia. 14 (An unsatisfactory block)

Blocking at White 1 instead of 3 in *Dia. 11* would let Black descend to 2, and White would have to connect at 3. Black's territory is too big, so this is a bit unsatisfactory for White. Without the stone at 'a', White does not have any way to harass the corner group.



Dia. 15




Dia. 16

Dia. 15 (Bad aji)


Instead of Black 6 in *Dia. 11*, the extension at 1 would allow White to play the forcing moves to White 6. Next, White attaches at 8, followed by Black 'a'–White 'b', so White will build greater thickness. The cut at 'c' is also an appealing move.

Dia. 16 (What happened in the game: 2)

White cut through at 1 and 3 to see how Black would respond. Black defended at 4, so White ataried at 5 and cut at 7. Black then ataried at 8 and played elsewhere. The cut at 'a' is worth more than 15 points.



Dia. 17



Dia. 18

Dia. 17 (Territorially more profitable)

Instead of 4 in *Dia. 16*, Black 1 would enable him to end in sente after White 6 and 8; it would be territorially more profitable as well. The capturing race is favorable for Black, since 'a' and 'b' are *miai*.

Dia. 18 (Squeeze)

Perhaps Cho disliked being forced with White 1 and 3. Omitting Black 4 would allow White to play 4 in sente. In addition, Black is

not happy that he has to answer White 'a' with 'b'. It is also possible for White to squeeze with the sequence 'b'–Black 'c'–White 'a'.




Figure 1C (1-54)

Figure 1C (1-54)

Later in June, Kataoka Satoshi played Takemiya's attachment with 45 against Cho Chikun in the third game of the Honinbo title match. Cho cut through with 46 and 48.




Figure 2C (55-66)


Figure 2C (55-66)

The result in the upper right corner was considered to be slightly favorable for White. White eventually won by 6 1/2 points. We will look at some variations.


Dia. 19 (The departure point)

Takemiya invented Black 8, and Cho came

up with the reponse of White 9. In this game, it was an effective move.




Dia. 19




Dia. 20

Dia. 20 (What happened in the game 1)

Black had no choice but to hane at 1 in order to slow White down. White hane at 2 then retreated to defend at 4, waiting to see how Black would play. White 2 at 3 would be too crude; no professional would play such a move. Instead of 4, White could atari at 'b' and end in sente, but the atari would only strengthen Black's stones on the outside. If White 'c' instead of 4, Black 'b' would not be a forcing move, but White would find it harder to break out to the right side.



Dia. 21



Dia. 22

Dia. 21 (Confinement)


If White connected at 1, Black would block with 2. White would have to play 3 or 'a' to make this group safe, but Black 4 and 6 are forcing moves, threatening a ladder which is in Black's favor. White's group would then be confined to the side, not a happy prospect.

Dia. 22 (What happened in the game 2)


After Dia. 20, Black extended to 1 and White slid to 2 to prevent Black 'a' as well as to aim at 'b'. Now, blocking with 'c' no longer affects the white group, so Black blocked at 3. White took territory with 4. The choice between taking territory and playing 'b' would depend on the position.

Dia. 23 (A fierce fight)

If Black played 1 here instead of 1 in *Dia. 22*, White would force with 2, then extend to 4. This would lead to a fierce fight on the right side. Jumping to 'a' instead of 2 would leave a weakness at 'b', which is bad for White.



Dia. 23




Dia. 24


Dia. 24 (Extending in the center)

White could also extend to 1, instead of 2 in *Dia. 22*, to emphasize the center. If Black blocks with 2, 3 and 4 would follow and the shape would be settled. In light of Black having one stone more, it is an even result.

If Black played 2 at 'a', it would then revert to the fight in the previous diagram.



Dia. 25




Dia. 26

Dia. 25 (A premature jump creates fragility)

Instead of White 2 in *Dia. 22*, immediately jumping into the corner with 1 would allow Black to probe with 2 and 4. If White 5, Black 6 and 8 would be severe, aiming to squeeze at 'a'. If White 5 at 'b', Black could atari at 5.

Dia. 26 (White ends in sente)

If Black blocks with 1 instead of 3 in *Dia. 22*, White 2 is absolutely necessary. Black then has to play 3 to prevent White 'a'. This is a reasonable variation which might be good in some positions. If White next extends to 'b', Black extends into the center at 'c', reverting to *Dia. 24*, but White may play elsewhere.



Dia. 27

Dia. 27 (A net is thick, too)

After *Dia. 22*, Black played elsewhere, but making a net at 1 to capture the white stone would also be a thick move. Since Black 'a' is sente, the white stone can't escape. In this skirmish, both sides struggled to end in sente.

(*Shinte Shingata Nenkan '95*. Translated by Furuyama Kazunari.)

Go Proverbs That Are Always True

by Furuyama Kazunari

3. Don't Atari Unnecessarily!

The first two articles in this series concerned proverbs about thickness, and understanding thickness is essential if you want to break out of the *kyu*-ranks and become a *dan*-level player. This article on *atari* is also targeted for *kyu* players, yet there are many points in the explanations from which even *dan* players will benefit.

The weaker players are, the more likely it

is that they will atari unnecessarily. One reason they tend to do this is because atari is easily understood (atari is the first thing they learn) and they get the feeling that by making an atari they are taking control of the game and forcing their opponents to answer. Moreover, they haven't learned any other concepts, such as shape, giving them a context in which they can decide whether or not to atari. Hope-


fully, this article will help them understand when to atari and when not to atari.

First, there are many problems here, all of which have one or two places where an atari can be played. Little by little, the problems become harder. If you can, not only try to find the right answers, but also try to explain why your answers are correct. Perhaps you will immediately see the correct answers, but you

may not understand the underlying concepts. If you cannot find the answers, then refer to the three hints right after the six problems below. They might help you solve these problems. After these easy problems, I have given four challenging problems for *dan* players. Try them as well. After studying this article, I am sure that you will have a better understanding of when to play atari.


Six Easy Problems

Black to Play in All Problems




Problem 1

Black has a cutting point at A. You have to defend there, but before you do that . . .




Problem 2

Black just attached at 1, and White answered with 2. How should Black continue?




Problem 3

White blocked with 1, leaving a cutting point at A. What should Black do?




Problem 4

This is a 5-4 point joseki. After White 9, Black A is a good move to seal off the left side. Should Black play this move immediately?



Problem 5

In this joseki, White plays a two-step hane with 6 and 8. How should Black respond? A white atari at A is severe, so Black has to prevent it. Think of what White's follow-up moves will be as well.



Problem 6

This is a star-point joseki. After White 1, Black wants to build a moyo at the top, so he needs to defend at A. Before he does that, are there any ataris or forcing moves that can give him immediate profit?


Hints for Knowing When to Atari

- Without the atari, will my opponent be able to take control of the situation?
- Am I erasing my ko threats?
- Am I erasing my opponent's bad aji?

If your answers to all of the above questions are 'No!', then you should atari.


Answers

Answer to Problem 1




Playing atari at A is not necessary. If you do not know why, then ask yourself: 'What can White do if I don't atari?' The best he can do is to play at A, which increases his territory by only one point and in gote. Moreover, Black gets a forcing move at B, giving him more thickness. Therefore, White will not play at A. In addition, an atari at Black A erases a ko threat, so the answer is not to atari, but to make good shape with 1. Note that Black 1 makes a better shape than Black C.

Answer to Problem 2




In this case, it is a good idea for Black to atari with 1. After this, Black can either play elsewhere or extend to A.



Proof

If Black does not atari, White will immediately push through at 1. Black can atari at 2,


but there are many cutting points remaining. If Black defends with A, White B strikes at Black's vital point, forcing him to make bad shape. If Black answers with C, White D becomes a forcing move. With 1 in the correct answer, Black does not have to worry about any of these annoyances.



Unnecessary

If Black has the marked stone in place, Black A becomes unnecessary. It is also a bad move because Black loses a ko threat. Even if White pushes through at A to create cutting points in Black's position, Black B is a forcing move. White must capture with C in gote, so Black can play elsewhere.


Needless to say, playing the marked stone would not be the correct answer, since Black would end in gote.



Answer to Problem 3


The atari of Black 1 is a good move because when White answers, his stones end up with one of the classic bad shapes called *jingasa*. Playing this atari against the marked stone is like hitting a nail at an angle: instead of standing, it will be flattened out against the wood.

After White 2, Black has several choices: at A, B, C, or even elsewhere. It all depends on the position. You should also note that even though White gets bad shape, the result is still a joseki.



Failure


Without the atari, connecting at 1 is not good. White can make a good shape by standing with 2, generating a lot of influence toward the center. There is no reason for Black to miss this chance to atari.




Proof

White's shape in the failure diagram is very good. This is why Black responds with 5 when White attaches at 2 and extends to 4. If Black neglects to play 5, White will play there and make an ideal shape.

Answer to Problem 4




The atari at 1 is absolutely necessary before Black plays the forcing moves at 3 and 5. Up to Black 9, the shape is settled. Without this atari, Black will not get a good result, as you can see in the following diagrams.




Failure 1

Simply forcing with Black 1 and 3 erases Black's other forcing move at A. After White captures with 4, he can ignore Black A. The top is now wide open for a white intrusion, so Black's thickness is inferior to the correct answer.



Failure 2


Once Black plays 1, it is too late to atari at 3. White will answer with 4, so Black can't force with A; instead, he has to defend a cutting point with 5 or B. Either way Black's thickness is inferior to that of the correct answer. You should note that the forcing moves of 1, 3, and 5 in the correct answer do not erase any bad aji of White's; these moves are only to Black's advantage.



A similar example


A similar example of when to play atari is found in this basic joseki. Even though White can atari at 24 any time during the moves from 14 to 22, it is unnecessary and it erases a ko threat. The proper time to play 24 is immediately before the forcing moves of White 26 and 28. (About ten years ago, Abe Yoshiteru

played 21 at 23, which was a new move in this joseki. Black 21 is no longer played in professional go today.)



Black's failure


Black can prevent White 24 in the preceding diagram by playing the hane of 23. However, White would connect at 24 and make a strong thick shape. Now, after Black 29, White can aggressively play 30 and 32, moves which were impossible before.




Variation

Black could choose this joseki instead. After 26, White has a severe ko threat at A, so this atari must not be played, as it is unnecessary.

Answer to Problem 5




Black should cut at 1 and extend to 3. The cut gives White bad shape and leaves him with bad *aji*. For example, if White ataris at 4, Black 5 becomes a forcing move. However, this does not mean that Black gets the advantage. The moves are a joseki, so the result is even. But without the cut of Black 1, the result would be advantageous for White.




Failure 1

If White is allowed to connect with 2, White gets good shape and Black A is no longer a sente.




Common variation

For the sake of clarity, the moves in the answer diagram were shown, but White 4 is the usual move. In response, Black can play 5, and White has the choice of responding with 6 or A. If Black hanes at A, then White can defend at 6 or aggressively cut at 5. Since this is not a joseki article, I will not analyze these variations. But the lesson to be learned here is that whatever happens, the cutting stone of Black 1 leaves White with bad *aji*. For example, if Black turns at A after White 6, the cutting stone occupies a liberty of the two white stones in the center, so White cannot play strongly in the center. Moreover, if Black plays somewhere at the top, White will be constrained in how he answers because of the stone at 1.



Failure 2


Failure 2: An atari at Black 3 is not only unnecessary but bad. This is a common mistake made by those who are not familiar with the joseki in the correct answer. After White 4, Black has to retreat to 5 to defend his cutting point. This exchange also helps strengthen White in the center.




Proof

Suppose White plays at A to defend his endangered stone. Black would then have many options: he could play at B or even elsewhere. In any case, Black doesn't have to give up sente.

Answer to Problem 6




Black should simply extend to 1 without playing a forcing sequence such as Black A-White B-Black C-White D. These moves erase important *aji* and are unnecessary since White doesn't have any good moves around here anyway after Black 1.




Proof

Proof: The best White can do in this area is to move out with 1. But since White's stones lack liberties, it is very hard for him to resist Black's pushing moves at 2 and 4. After 5, if you are a *kyu* player, you can simply continue building thickness in the center with 6. Black should welcome White 1 because his moyo becomes bigger. But if you are a *dan* player, you might want to mix things up by playing the variation in the next diagram.




Variation

Black can also cut at 6 to take advantage of White's shortage of liberties. If White ataris at 7, Black 8 is a tesuji which forces White to play 9. Only after White connects at 11 does Black have to come back and connect at 12. After 16, Black has the advantage.



Aji

Besides Black A and C in the correct answer, all the black moves from A to E here are forcing moves. Black F and G might also be forcing moves if the ladder is in Black's favor. The problem is that Black does not know which one of these forcing moves he will want to play later in the game. If one of them becomes an attack on white stones elsewhere, Black might then be able to launch a double attack in which White will find it impossible to avoid a loss.



Ladder

10: connects

This diagram shows an example of how a ladder arises if White is able to play a stone at F in the preceding diagram. The sequence from Black 1 to 11 sets up a ladder if a stone at F is in place.

For all these reasons Black must not play any unnecessary ataris or any of the forcing moves shown in the diagrams above.

With all the forcing moves that Black has after the completion of the joseki in *Problem 6*, it may be difficult for you to imagine how Black can take advantage of White's bad *aji*. Here is an example from a game between two amateur 1-dan players.




Figure 1

In *Figure 1*, the joseki in this problem has been played out in the upper right corner and the action has moved to the lower right corner where Black presses with 1 and 3. The moves to White 4 are a joseki.






Figure 2

After White 4, Black played an old joseki up to 14 in *Figure 2*, believing that by making White overconcentrated on the right side she would obtain a good result. But actually she missed a chance to put White into big trouble.



Dia. 1



Dia. 2

18: connects

Black 5 in *Dia. 1* is a sharp tesuji, taking advantage of White's bad *aji*. It may seem as if White can push up at 6, but after 7 Black threatens to push through at 8 and take the corner, so White connects at 8 himself.


However, Black can now play the sequence to 25 in *Dia. 2*. If White next defends his corner with A, Black will defend at B and White's stones floating in the center without a base. If White goes after the black stones in the center by playing around B, Black will kill the white stones below by playing at A.

Black also has a move at C, which threatens to start a one-step ko to kill the white stones in the corner.


Note that if White answered Black 5 by descending to 7 with 6 in *Dia. 1*, Black would capture the white group above in a ladder.

Instead of 8 in *Dia. 1*, if White plays 8 in *Dia. 3*, Black will still play the sequence up to White 22. With 23 and 25, Black can kill the corner group. This outcome is certainly to Black's advantage. Black could also play A instead of 23, followed by White B—Black C. This fight is also advantageous for Black.

There is one more counter move that White can play: the hane of 6 in *Dia. 4*, which prevents the ladder. But Black 7 and 9 will put White into a difficult position. After 22, Black 23 is enough to keep up the pressure on White.




Dia. 3




Dia. 4

Four Challenging Problems




Problem 7

This position arises from a variation of the *Taisha* joseki. The three black stones on the right are already captured. Is it reasonable for Black to atari in the center?




Problem 9

After exchanging 1 for White 2, how should Black play in this position? Hint: since Black cannot save his two marked stones, he should use them to make thickness.



Problem 8


White 1 and 3 make bad shape, especially since the marked stone is not properly linked up to the allies to the left. After 7, Black can capture White 1 and 3. How?



Problem 10

Should Black atari at A? How do you justify your answer?


Answer to Problem 7



Aji


Black must never atari here, for that will erase White's bad *aji*. This situation is similar to the previous problem: by aiming to cut off the white stone, Black gets many forcing moves around here.

For example, all of the black moves from A to H threaten to capture the marked white stone. Moreover, moves such as I, J, or K, although they do not threaten to capture directly, also have an effect on the marked stone.



Correct move

In fact, it would be wise for White to play one more move at 1 to eliminate his bad *aji* because it restrains his movement around here. From Black's point of view, even if White defends with 1, it will have no effect on him, so Black can play elsewhere again. Therefore, it is better not to atari in the problem diagram.




Dia. 1


In contrast, if White were to extend to A in *Dia. 1*, it would erase Black's influence at the top. Therefore, Black must atari at, especially

A before he starts building a moyo at the top. In the position in the correct-move diagram White 1 does not adversely affect Black's influence.

The position in *Dia. 2* arises from a joseki created by Kajiwarra Takeo 9-dan. Again Black must immediately atari at A. If not, White will certainly extend to A, separating Black into two weak groups. After White connects at 2 in *Dia. 3*, Black will play at A or B, aiming to make thickness on the outside.



Dia. 2



Dia. 3






Figure 3

The game in *Figure 3*, played between two 3-dans, is an example of a position in which Black can take advantage of White's bad *aji* in the upper right corner where the joseki in *Problem 7* was played. Unfortunately, in the game Black immediately ataried at A and White answered at B. Later, White played 1 to capture five black stones. Interestingly, if Black had not made the A-B exchange, White 1 would not have worked: Black would have been able to set up a double attack against White's positions on the left and the right. How could he do this?



Exploiting the aji

Black 1, 3, and 5, are a tesuji combination. Now, depending on how White answers, Black can capture either three stones on the right or the marked stone on the left. After that, there is no way White can save himself from this disastrous situation.




Continuation


If White plays 1, Black ataris with 2. If White resists with 3 to 7, Black can kill four stones on the right with 8. If White 7 at 8, Black captures at 7. White will suffer a huge loss on either the right or the left.

It is impossible to know how White's bad *aji* in the joseki of *Problem 7* can be exploited in a game. However, this example shows why you never want to erase White's bad *aji* with an atari. If your opponent has a weakness, leave it alone until it is ripe to fall.

Answer to Problem 8




Black 1 and 3 are a tesuji combination. It is now impossible for White to save his two marked stones. After Black 3, if White plays A, the sequence Black B–White C–Black D follows, capturing the marked stones.




Failure

The atari at 1 eliminates any chance that Black will capture White's stones. Even if Black plays a 'tesuji' of 3 and 5, White can connect with 6 and 8, while capturing Black 5. This is a classic example which shows how important it is not to atari unnecessarily.

Answer to Problem 9




Even though it looks slow, extending to 1 is the best move. The sequence to White 10 is joseki and the shape is settled.




Failure

The atari at 1 is a crude move. Note that after Black 3 the reason White ataris at 4 is to give Black bad shape and make his stones heavy. Now White captures the two black stones with 6.

Answer to Problem 10




Black must atari at 1, then capture with 3. This atari makes an enormous difference at the bottom.



Invasion


For example, if Black invades at 1, after White responds with 2, Black can capture the four stones on the right with the tesuji combination of 3 and 5. Therefore, White can't play 2, but must defend his weakness on the right instead, so Black will easily be able to estab-

lish a presence within White's moyo on the lower left side by playing at 2 himself.




Black's failure

Without the atari, Black's invasion is not so severe. White can simply pincer it at 2. Now, even if Black ataris, White will not connect at A, but attack the black stone with 4. When Black captures white stones with A, the marked black stone becomes redundant.



Failure variation

If Black does not atari in the correct answer, Black 3 and 5 do not work. White will draw back with 6 and the black stone at 1 is in big trouble.



For the endgame

In a position such as this, there is no way that Black can invade White's territory on the left. So instead of the atari at A, Black should simply capture with 1 and later atari at B, followed by White C. Territorially the atari of B is about a point better than A.


An Introduction to Tesuji: Answers

Tesujis for Separating Stones

Problem 1.

Cutting across the knight's move

Whether on the side or the center, cutting across the knight's move is an effective tesuji for separating stones. The answer to Problem 1 shows an example of this tesuji.




Dia. 1. Cutting across the knight's move

Cutting across the knight's move with Black 1 is the tesuji. Since the shape is symmetrical, Black 'a' would also separate the white stones.

Dia. 2. Separated

If White resists with 1, Black ataris with 2. When White defends with 'a', Black connects with 'b' and the white stones on the left are dead.




Dia. 3. Black fails

The tesuji of Black 1 or Black 'a' in *Dia. 1* is the only way. Black 1 here fails to accomplish anything. White can link up his stones with the moves from 2 to 6.

Dia. 4. White's correct move

If White wants to link up his stones, the diagonal move of White 1 is the best way, even though it is farther from the stones White wants to link up with.




Dia. 5. No way to separate White

If Black tries to cut through White's shape with 1, White can easily link up with 2 and 4.

Dia. 6. On the second line

Cutting across the knight's move is also an effective tesuji even when your opponent's stones are not at the edge of the board. Where should White play in this position?




Dia. 7. Tesuji

Black 1 also cuts across the knight's move. After 3, Black next threatens to cut at 'a'.

Dia. 8. Sacrifice

When White defends with 1, Black ataris with 2, sacrificing a stone, then extends to 4, isolating the three white stones on the left.




Dia. 9. Variation

White might try resisting with 2, but Black plays 3, forcing White to defend with 4. Next Black plays 5 and White cannot atari at 'a' because he is short of liberties.

Problem 2.

Exploiting White's shortage of liberties

When your opponent is short of liberties, he often finds that he is unable to play on a vital point. In *Problem 2*, Black can prevent White from linking up his stones by exploiting his shortage of liberties.



Dia. 1


Dia. 2

Dia. 1. Hane on the inside

The answer to *Problem 2* is similar to *Dia. 9* above. When Black plays 1, White cannot cut at 'a' because he will find himself short of liberties.

Dia. 2. Tesuji

If White resists with 1, Black keeps up the pressure with 2. After the exchange of 3 for 4, White cannot play at 'a' without putting himself into atari.



Dia. 3

Dia. 4

Dia. 3. Variation


If White jumps to 2, White simply descends to 3. If White now plays 'a', Black ataris with 'b' and captures three white stones.

Dia. 4. Example 1


Black wants to prevent the three marked stones from linking up to its allies on the left. However, White has an annoying atari at 'a'. How should Black play?

Dia. 5. Failure

If Black simply descends to 1, White ataris at 2 and catches two black stones when he plays 4.




Dia. 5




Dia. 6

Dia. 6. Miai

Black 1 also fails. After White connects at 2, he can atari at 'a' or 'b'. Either way, he will be able to link up his stones.



Dia. 7




Dia. 8

Dia. 7. The tesuji


Cutting with Black 1 is the tesuji. If White ataris with 2, Black 3 sets up a snapback: if White captures at 'a', Black will recapture four stones by playing below 2.

Dia. 8. Shortage of liberties

If White answers Black 1 with 2, Black plays 3, separating the white stones. Again White can't atari at 3 because he is short of liberties.



Dia. 9




Dia. 10

Dia. 9. Example 2

It is easy to separate the two marked stones from its allies on the right, but how does Black accomplish this in sente?

Dia. 10. Gote


Black 1 forces White to connect with 2, but after 3, Black ends in gote.



Dia. 11

Dia. 11. Correct Answer

Black should first cut with 1, then atari with 3 and 5. The three white stones on the right are now cut off from their allies on the left and Black still has sente.



Dia. 12


Dia. 12. Not a tesuji

Black 1 is a lukewarm move. White defends his position by forcing with 2 and ends in sente.

Problem 3

The placement tesuji


The placement tesuji is another technique that can be used to separate your opponent's stones. This is the tesuji that you must use to solve *Problem 3*.



Dia. 1

Dia. 1. The vital point

A player who can read a couple of moves ahead should be able to find Black 1 at a glance. Once Black plays this move the three white stones on the right have no chance of linking up to their allies on the left whether White plays at 'a' or at 'b'.




Dia. 2

Dia. 2. Captured


If White connects at 1, Black will capture three white stones with 2.

Dia. 3. An example

This problem is a bit more difficult, but the idea is the same. If this position occurred in one of your games, do you think you could find the right move?




Dia. 3



Dia. 4

Dia. 4. The vital point


Black 1 is the vital point. It threatens to separate the white stones above from the ones below by playing at either 'a' or 'b'.



Dia. 5

Dia. 5. Miai


If White pushes through with 1, Black defends with 2 and he can still keep White separated by playing 'a' or 'b'.



Dia. 6

Dia. 6. Failure

The atari of Black 1 fails. White links up with 2 and 4, sacrificing one stone. If Black plays 3 at 4, White captures a stone at 'a' and succeeds in linking up his stones.



Dia. 7

Dia. 7. Ko

Black 1 is better than the preceding diagram because it results in a ko. After Black 5, White captures the stone at 3 and a ko results. But since Black 1 in *Dia. 4* unconditionally breaks the link between the white stones, this result must be considered a failure.

(Let's Go, May 1994. Translated by Richard Bozulich.)

10th NEC Cup: Japan–China Super Go

China's New Hero, Chang Hao

Just a few years back, in 1990, Chang Hao made a precocious debut, winning the 12th World Amateur Go Championship, held in Hiroshima, at the age of 13, making him the youngest amateur world champion ever. Chang turned professional after returning to China after the tournament and since then has developed rapidly, establishing himself as the top post-Ma player.

Everyone knew that Chang was very talented, but even so no one was prepared for his extraordinary achievement in the 10th Japan–China Super Go series in 1995: defeating five Japanese players in a row, including three title-holders, the Tengen, Kisei, and Gosei.

The 10th series was an important one for Japan: it trailed China 4–5 in the nine series to date, so it had to win to restore its honour. Things started badly when Kato Tomoko, the Japanese Women's Meijin, lost to Hua Xueming 7-dan, the woman who beat Otake Hideo in the 1994 Fujitsu Cup, but Mimura Tomoyasu 6-dan immediately evened the score.

That was when Chang Hao started his marvellous run, defeating Mimura, Morita

Michihiro 7-dan, Ryu Shikun Tengen, Kobayashi Satoru Kisei, and Rin Kaiho Gosei. Single-handedly, Chang Hao, the second player on his team, had taken the Chinese to the verge of victory. This is the performance of a champion — surely it can't be long before he challenges Ma's supremacy in Chinese tournaments.

The last player on the Japanese team, Otake Hideo, finally put a stop to the rout and then launched a strong counterattack (see news section), but it will be a long time before the Japanese get over the shock delivered by the eighteen-year-old new star from China.

In this article we present the last two games from Chang's winning streak, beginning with his victory over Japan's top title holder.

Game Six

White: Kobayashi Satoru Kisei (Japan)

Black: Chang Hao 7-dan (China)

Komi: 5½; time: 3 hours each

Played at the Nihon Ki-in on 3 September 1995. Adapted from a report by Kawamura Katsuya.



China's new hero: Chang Hao

Born 7 November 1976 in Shanghai, became 1-dan in 1988. Won the 5th World Youth Championship in 1988 and the 12th World Amateur Go Championship in 1990. Came 7th in the Chinese National Championship in 1989.




Figure 1 (1–50)

Figure 1 (1-50)

The reader may wonder why the Kisei is not the top player on the Japanese team, but it was chosen before Kobayashi Satoru won that title.

White 20, 22. Going into the corner like this is not seen very often. Usually White attaches with 20 at 26, followed by Black 21, White 22.

Black 29. The only move.

White's strategy with 34 to 38 was not well received in the pressroom. Rin Kaiho advocated playing 36 at 37, but Kobayashi said after the game that he didn't like Black's atari at A.




Figure 2 (51-100)

Figure 2 (51-100)

Black 59. This attack does not achieve very much, mainly because of White's good move at 68.

White launches a strong attack with 74 and 76. He takes the lead when he captures three stones up to 86. Even though Black cuts at 87, he hasn't completely secured the capture of the white stones here.

Figure 3 (101-155)

White 6. White sets out to decide the game.

White 20. White is suffering from a hallucination. Although he cuts off the black group up to 28, the addition of the hane at 15 means that living and linking up are *miai*

for Black.

Going back a bit, when White plays 12, he misses his chance to play at 1 in *Dia. 1*. After the exchange to 4, he can switch back to the top at 5. This is far superior to the result in the game.

Kobayashi's attempt to clinch the game backfires on him.

White ropes off the left side with 38 and 40, but his territory is too small when Black plays 41.





Figure 3 (101-155)



Dia. 1

Kobayashi: I thought it was the same whenever I played 20. This was an awful misreading.

Figure 4 (155-215) (next page)

White resigns after Black 215.



The Japanese Kisei bows to China's new hope.




Figure 4 (156-215)

Game Seven

White: Chang Hao 7-dan (China)

Black: Rin Kaiho Gosei (Japan)

Played at the Nihon Ki-in on 5 September 1995. Adapted from a report by Kawamura Katsuya.

Figure 1 (1-30)

Rin's strategy with 23 to 29 did not meet with a warm reception in the pressroom. Yo




Figure 1 (1-60)


Kagen 7-dan, a Taiwanese player who helped out with the interpreting, said: 'Yu Bin was saying that Black 1 in *Dia. 1* was preferable. Even after White 2, White still has chinks in his position. For that reason, Yu maintained that the marked stone should have been played at 'a'.'

When it's put like this, you can see that, what with the various forcing moves White has [in the figure], there's not much of a difference between the territory Black gets in

the diagram and in the figure.

Black 35. The players in the pressroom examined the alternative of A but couldn't come to a definite conclusion.

Black 45 is an all-out move; an interesting exchange follows to 53. No one ventured a comment on who had done better. Does that mean that the result was satisfactory for both sides? Certainly, it seems to be a close game.



Dia. 1




Figure 2 (61-110)

Figure 2 (61-110)

Black 61 and 65 show that Black is concerned about White's thickness below.

Black 77 is the highlight of the middle game: cut at A if you have the nerve, Black seems to be saying — I'll cut at B and take the corner.

White is cowed into defending at 78, but Black gets an easy game when he cuts at 79. White does get good forcing moves at 80 and 82, though.

Black develops excellent momentum with the moves from 85 to 91.


White 92 loses points — usually you'd expect White to connect at 93. Presumably Chang thought that White 93 would lead to a slow but sure loss. White 92 aims at attacking the black group above.

The game seems to have been decided when Black reinforces in the centre with 101 to 105, but there is a pitfall lurking here.

The pitfall is Black 107. When Black plays here, he has to answer White 108 by capturing at 109, so White is able to strike a blow at 110.

The players in the pressroom investigated Black C in response, but Rin commented later: 'That's no good — too thin.'

The conclusion Rin and Chang came to when reviewing the game with Otake was that Black should have reinforced with 107 at 1 in Dia. 2. That would give Black an unloseable game.






Figure 3 (111-154)
ko: 38 (at 28), 52: ko (left of 29)




Figure 5 (201-228)




Figure 4 (155-200)
58: ko (left of 55);
66: captures two stones; 67: ko (at 55)

Figures 4 & 5

Neither Kobayashi Satoru nor Rin played his best against Chang, but that doesn't detract from Chang's remarkable achievement. He's a real find for the Chinese: what with Nie at 43, Ma at 31, and Chang at 19, they have a champion in each age group. Korea has the 20-year-old Lee. There's no one like Lee or Chang on the horizon in Japan.

Black resigns after White 228.

(Go Weekly, 19 September 1995. Translated by John Power.)



Otake looks puzzled, Chang Hao looks formidable after his fifth win in a row. Otake did his best to undo Chang's good work, but wasn't quite up to beating the whole Chinese team.

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